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THE EXCEPTIONS CLAUSE AS A  
STRUCTURAL SAFEGUARD 
 
Tara Leigh Grove 
Scholars have long treated the Exceptions Clause of Article III as a 
serious threat to the Supreme Court’s central constitutional function: 
establishing definitive and uniform rules of federal law. This Article 
argues that scholars have overlooked an important function of the 
Clause. Congress has repeatedly used its broad “exceptions power” to 
facilitate, not to undermine, the Supreme Court’s constitutional role. 
Drawing on insights from social science, this Article asserts that 
Congress has an incentive to use its control over federal jurisdiction to 
promote the Court’s role in settling disputed federal questions. Notably, 
this argument has considerable historical support. When the Supreme 
Court’s mandatory appellate docket grew to the point that it was un-
manageable for a single tribunal, Congress responded by exercising its 
authority under the Exceptions Clause. Congress made “exceptions” to 
the Court’s mandatory appellate jurisdiction and replaced it with 
discretionary review via writs of certiorari—precisely so that the Court 
could concentrate its limited resources on resolving important federal 
questions. Thus, contrary to conventional wisdom, Congress has often 
used its broad exceptions power to safeguard the Supreme Court’s role in 
the constitutional scheme. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Exceptions Clause of Article III has long been viewed as a sword 
of Damocles hanging over the Supreme Court.1 The Clause, which 
provides that the Court’s appellate jurisdiction is subject to “such 
Exceptions, and . . . such Regulations as the Congress shall make,”2 seems 
to give Congress a license to remove any category of cases—including 
those involving constitutional and other important federal issues—from 
the Supreme Court’s purview. Scholars thus worry that the Exceptions 
Clause is an ever-present threat to what they see as the Court’s central 
constitutional function: defining the content of federal law for the 
judiciary.3 
                                                                                                                 
1. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The Unitary Executive, Jurisdiction 
Stripping, and the Hamdan Opinions: A Textualist Response to Justice Scalia, 107 Colum. 
L. Rev. 1002, 1044 (2007) (arguing that, broadly construed, Exceptions Clause would be “a 
threat to judicial review”); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the 
Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1362, 1365 (1953) 
(urging, if Exceptions Clause gives Congress unlimited power over Supreme Court’s 
appellate jurisdiction, then “the Constitution . . . authoriz[es] its own destruction”). 
2. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. 
3. See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court 
Precedents?, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 817, 837, 873 (1994) (contending Congress must give Court 
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This Article offers a new account of the Exceptions Clause. The 
Article asserts that Congress has largely used its power over the Supreme 
Court’s appellate jurisdiction to safeguard, not to undermine, the 
Court’s constitutional role. In other words, Congress has made “excep-
tions” and “regulations” that facilitate the Court’s role in providing a 
definitive and uniform resolution of federal questions. 
Although it may seem surprising that Congress would use its control 
over federal jurisdiction so as to benefit the Court, a strand of social 
science research suggests why Congress might have an incentive to 
facilitate the Court’s role in resolving federal questions. Social scientists 
have argued that political actors establish (and later abide by) legal 
constraints, including constitutional rules and judicial decisions, because 
they contribute to economic and social stability. Judicial determinations 
serve to settle disputed issues and thereby provide focal points around 
which political actors and citizens can coordinate their actions. The 
Supreme Court performs this settlement function for issues that are 
referred to the judiciary. Even controversial Court decisions establish (at 
least temporarily) the boundaries of permissible governmental and 
private conduct and thereby facilitate coordination. This social science 
research thus suggests why Congress might be inclined to enact jurisdic-
tional legislation that promotes the Supreme Court’s settlement 
function. Political actors—even when they disagree with specific 
Supreme Court decisions—may find that the benefits of a uniform 
resolution of federal law outweigh the costs of “erroneous” decisions. 
There is considerable historical evidence that Congress has used its 
control over federal jurisdiction to facilitate the Supreme Court’s settle-
ment function. Congress has not generally sought to curtail the Supreme 
Court’s appellate jurisdiction but instead has steadily expanded it—
precisely so that the Court could settle disputed federal questions. But 
these expansions had an adverse impact: They created a series of work-
load crises at the Supreme Court that undermined its capacity to provide 
guidance on the content of federal law. The Court simply lacked the time 
                                                                                                                 
“subject matter jurisdiction sufficiently broad” to perform its “‘essential function’: 
providing general leadership in defining federal law”); Laurence Claus, The One Court 
that Congress Cannot Take Away: Singularity, Supremacy, and Article III, 96 Geo. L.J. 59, 
64 (2007) (arguing “Congress can never . . . remove from the Supreme Court the ability to 
have ultimate judgment of Article III matters”); Leonard G. Ratner, Congressional Power 
over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 157, 161 (1960) 
(asserting Supreme Court’s “essential appellate functions” are to preserve uniformity and 
supremacy of federal law); see also Paul M. Bator, Congressional Power over the 
Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 27 Vill. L. Rev. 1030, 1038–39 (1982) (arguing, 
although Exceptions Clause permits Congress to strip Court’s appellate jurisdiction over 
any class of cases, such law would “violate the spirit of the Constitution” because 
Constitution “contemplate[s] . . . a federal Supreme Court with the power to pronounce 
uniform and authoritative rules of federal law”); supra note 1 (citing sources identifying 
Exceptions Clause as threat to Court). 
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and the resources to decide the mounting number of cases and legal 
issues before it. 
Congress responded by exercising its authority under the Exceptions 
Clause. In a series of statutes, Congress made “exceptions” to the Court’s 
mandatory appellate jurisdiction and replaced it with discretionary 
review via writs of certiorari.4 These laws, much like the jurisdictional ex-
pansions that preceded them, were designed to facilitate what Congress 
saw as the Supreme Court’s “principal functions”: “resolv[ing]” im-
portant issues of federal law and “ensur[ing] uniformity . . . in the law by 
resolving conflicts” among the lower courts.5 
Notably, these jurisdictional expansions and exceptions had wide-
spread political support. This political response contrasts sharply with the 
political dynamics surrounding court-curbing proposals. Congressional 
reactions to such measures have split largely along partisan lines. For 
example, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the federal 
judiciary was viewed as biased in favor of big business. Thus, populists 
and progressives sought to strip federal jurisdiction or otherwise curtail 
federal judicial power, while economic conservatives (who favored the 
judiciary’s probusiness rulings) blocked those court-curbing efforts. In 
the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, the source of con-
troversy was the constitutional jurisprudence of the Warren Court (and 
its progeny). Social conservatives repeatedly sought to strip federal juris-
diction over cases ranging from abortion to school prayer. But social 
progressives supported the judiciary’s constitutional rulings and success-
fully fought those jurisdiction-stripping attempts. 
By contrast, during those same periods, both sides came together to 
enact legislation to preserve the Supreme Court’s role in settling the 
contours of federal law. Thus, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, populists and progressives joined the economic conservatives 
to support the first statutes granting discretionary certiorari review. Like-
wise, in more modern times, even as social conservatives and social pro-
gressives fought bitterly over jurisdiction-stripping proposals, both sides 
agreed in 1988 to expand the Court’s certiorari power to encompass 
virtually every appeal. This historical evidence suggests that, even when 
politicians disagree with specific Supreme Court decisions, they still see 
value in—and use the “exceptions power” to protect—the Supreme 
Court’s role in resolving important federal questions. 
This Article does not, however, mean to suggest that the Exceptions 
Clause has always served to protect the Supreme Court. On the contrary, 
on a few occasions, Congress has used its authority to restrict the Court’s 
appellate jurisdiction over a class of claims. But, despite these examples, 
                                                                                                                 
4. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 100-300, at 3 (1988) (stating certiorari jurisdiction is based 
on Congress’s power to make “exceptions” to Court’s appellate jurisdiction). 
5. H.R. Rep. No. 100-660, at 14 (1988). 
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the broader point remains: Contrary to conventional wisdom, the pri-
mary function of the Exceptions Clause has been to preserve, not to 
undermine, the Supreme Court’s role in the constitutional scheme. 
This argument adds an important perspective to scholarship on the 
federal judiciary. First, the approach here differs markedly from prior 
scholarship on Congress’s power over federal jurisdiction, which 
generally assumes that the political branches and the Supreme Court 
have an antagonistic relationship and thus theorizes about how the Court 
should protect itself from (possible) future court-curbing measures.6 This 
Article, by contrast, looks at how Congress has in practice exercised its 
power over federal jurisdiction. This historical account shows that 
Congress has repeatedly used its authority to support and empower the 
Supreme Court. Second, the analysis here provides an important contrast 
to the interpretive method employed by prior scholars. Almost without 
exception, commentary on jurisdiction stripping seeks to unearth the 
original meaning of Article III to find judicially enforceable limits on 
Congress’s power.7 In sharp contrast, the analysis here illustrates how the 
Exceptions Clause has been given content over time—not by the 
judiciary, but by the political branches. This argument thus links up with 
a growing literature in constitutional law emphasizing the crucial role of 
the political branches in constitutional interpretation.8 
The argument proceeds as follows. Part I discusses prior scholarship 
on Congress’s power over the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction and 
asserts that the Exceptions Clause serves as an important (and previously 
unrecognized) structural safeguard for the Court. Parts II through IV 
provide historical support for this claim. Even in the midst of some of the 
bitterest partisan struggles over the federal judiciary, political actors 
repeatedly came together to ensure the Supreme Court’s role in defining 
the content of federal law. Finally, Part V examines the implications and 
limitations of this analysis. That Part argues that, due to both political 
incentives and constitutional constraints, Congress has largely safe-
guarded the Supreme Court’s role in the constitutional scheme. 
                                                                                                                 
6. See infra Part II.A. 
7. See infra Part II.A. 
8. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes: The 
New American Constitution 14 (2010) (asserting, in United States, “normative 
commitments are announced and entrenched not through . . . [c]onstitutional amend-
ments or Supreme Court pronouncements but instead through . . . legislation, adminis-
trative implementation, [and] public feedback”); Larry D. Kramer, The People 
Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review 109 (2004) (arguing each 
branch has independent role in constitutional interpretation, subject to ultimate 
judgment of people); Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Construction: Divided Powers 
and Constitutional Meaning 3 (1999) (arguing political branches have crucial role in 
“construct[ing] constitutional meaning”). 
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I. THE THEORY 
Scholars have long puzzled over the scope of Congress’s authority to 
regulate federal jurisdiction and, particularly, the Supreme Court’s 
appellate jurisdiction. Although most scholars agree that Congress’s 
power is limited by constitutional sources other than Article III (known 
as “external” limits),9 they strongly dispute whether there are any 
“internal” limits—that is, whether the provisions of Article III (as eluci-
dated by the text, structure, and history) themselves constrain Congress. 
Commentators differ considerably in their approaches to this question, 
but they do appear to agree on one fundamental assumption: Any 
plenary congressional power to make “exceptions” to the Supreme 
Court’s appellate jurisdiction is a serious threat to the Court. This Article 
argues that scholars have largely overlooked the ways in which Congress 
can use its authority to safeguard the Supreme Court’s role in defining 
the content of federal law.10  
A. The Debate over Congress’s Power Under the Exceptions Clause 
Many commentators conclude that Congress has plenary power to 
restrict federal jurisdiction, including the Supreme Court’s appellate 
jurisdiction.11 These scholars observe that the Exceptions Clause, on its 
                                                                                                                 
9. For example, there is broad consensus that Congress may not enact a jurisdictional 
measure that violates the Equal Protection Clause or the Suspension Clause. Although 
scholars dispute the precise scope of these external constraints, they generally agree that 
these provisions limit Congress’s power. See Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to 
Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 
Stan. L. Rev. 895, 916 (1984) (“Scholars agree that the Bill of Rights applies to all areas of 
congressional action, and that . . . Congress could not limit access to the federal courts on 
the basis of race . . . .”); Martin H. Redish, Same-Sex Marriage, the Constitution, and 
Congressional Power to Control Federal Jurisdiction: Be Careful What You Wish For, 9 
Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 363, 368–69 (2005) [hereinafter Redish, Same-Sex Marriage] 
(asserting there are “external limitations” on Congress’s power, including due process and 
equal protection); Amanda L. Tyler, Suspension as an Emergency Power, 118 Yale L.J. 600, 
607–08 (2009) (noting Suspension Clause, “[b]y its terms, . . . constitutes . . . a limitation 
upon . . . congressional power” over habeas jurisdiction, but also observing scholars have 
debated whether Clause requires Congress to confer habeas jurisdiction). 
10. Notably, in this Article, the term “jurisdiction stripping” refers to efforts to 
restrict federal jurisdiction over a class of cases, such as those involving school prayer. Such 
restrictions are likewise the focus of other scholarly literature on this subject. 
11. See Charles L. Black Jr., Decision According to Law 18 (1981) (“My own position 
is . . . that Congress does have very significant power over the courts’ jurisdiction.”); Raoul 
Berger, Insulation of Judicial Usurpation: A Comment on Lawrence Sager’s “Court-
Stripping” Polemic, 44 Ohio St. L.J. 611, 622 (1983) (arguing “[t]he burden is on [those 
who would challenge Congress’s authority] to demonstrate that the plenary, unequivocal 
terms of the exceptions clause mean less than they say”); Martin H. Redish, Text, 
Structure, and Common Sense in the Interpretation of Article III, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1633, 
1637 (1990) (arguing “the inescapable implication of the text is that Congress possesses 
broad power to curb the jurisdiction of both the lower courts and the Supreme Court”); 
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face, seems to give Congress broad authority to remove classes of cases 
from the Court’s appellate oversight.12 Furthermore, this construction 
accords with at least some Founding-era evidence. For example, the First 
Congress in the Judiciary Act of 1789 did not give the Supreme Court 
jurisdiction over every federal question case.13 Based on such textual and 
historical evidence, these scholars assert that “if Congress wishes to 
exclude a certain category of federal constitutional (or other) litigation 
from the appellate jurisdiction [of the Supreme Court], it has the 
authority to do so.”14 Indeed, Congress could withhold even “a large 
number of classes of cases potentially within [the Court’s] appellate juris-
diction.”15 
But even those who subscribe to this “plenary power” theory argue 
that Congress should generally refrain from exercising its authority.16 For 
example, Paul Bator argues that a statute eliminating Supreme Court 
review of federal claims would violate “the structure and spirit” of the 
                                                                                                                 
Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 1001, 1005 (1965) 
[hereinafter Wechsler, The Courts] (asserting “Congress has the power by enactment of a 
statute to strike at what it deems judicial excess by delimitations of the jurisdiction of the 
lower courts and of the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction”). 
12. See Bator, supra note 3, at 1040 (arguing that, given text of Exceptions Clause, 
“arguments that would place serious limits on the power of Congress to make exceptions 
to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court are not, in the end, persuasive”); 
Berger, supra note 11, at 623 (contending Congress’s authority to control Court’s 
appellate jurisdiction was “a power exercised and accepted from the beginning”); 
Gunther, supra note 9, at 901 (noting that “[o]n its face, the exceptions clause of article 
III, section 2, seems to grant a quite unconfined power to Congress” to restrict appellate 
jurisdiction); Martin H. Redish, Congressional Power to Regulate Supreme Court 
Appellate Jurisdiction Under the Exceptions Clause: An Internal and External 
Examination, 27 Vill. L. Rev. 900, 901–02 (1982) [hereinafter Redish, Congressional 
Power] (“A common sense interpretation of the constitutional language [in the 
Exceptions Clause] would seem to lead to the conclusion that Congress possesses fairly 
broad authority to curb Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction.”). 
13. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 11, at 632–33 (“The Judiciary Act of 1789, enacted by 
the First Congress, which was privy to the Framers’ intention, . . . left large gaps and 
gaping holes in the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.”). For a description of 
the Court’s jurisdiction under the 1789 Act, see infra notes 79–82 and accompanying text. 
14. Bator, supra note 3, at 1038. 
15. Gunther, supra note 9, at 901. 
16. See, e.g., Redish, Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 9, at 368–69 (arguing, “as a 
matter of policy,” Congress should have “a very strong presumption” against jurisdiction 
stripping); Wechsler, The Courts, supra note 11, at 1006–07 (asserting there are important 
“practical objections” to stripping Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction, because “the 
judicial institution needs an organ of supreme authority” to establish uniform rules of 
federal law). One exception to this general sentiment is Charles Black, who argues that the 
existence of a plenary congressional power over federal jurisdiction was essential to 
legitimating judicial decisions. See Black, supra note 11, at 18 (“‘Jurisdiction’ is the power to 
decide. If Congress has wide and deep-going power over the courts’ jurisdiction, then the 
courts’ power to decide is a continuing and visible concession from a democratically formed 
Congress.”). 
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Constitution.17 He claims, “[T]he structure contemplated by that instru-
ment makes sense—and was thought to make sense—only on the 
premise that there would be a federal Supreme Court with the power to 
pronounce uniform and authoritative rules of federal law.”18 Likewise, 
Gerald Gunther urges Congress to exercise “forbearance” in using its 
“very broad ‘exceptions’ power.”19 He states, “[O]ur system—any 
system—would be poorer and less coherent in the absence of a single, 
ultimately authoritative court at the apex of the judicial hierarchy.”20 
Other scholars, however, have proposed broader and judicially 
enforceable limits on Congress’s power over the Supreme Court’s 
appellate jurisdiction. The foundation for this argument is laid in a 
famous essay by Henry Hart. In his Dialogue, Professor Hart asserts that 
“the exceptions [to the Court’s appellate jurisdiction] must not be such 
as will destroy the essential role of the Supreme Court in the constitu-
tional plan.”21 Other scholars have expanded upon this theory—
primarily by relying on evidence of the original understanding of Article 
III.22 For example, Leonard Ratner asserts (based in large part on state-
ments made at the Constitutional Convention) that the Supreme Court’s 
“essential appellate functions” are to preserve the uniformity and 
                                                                                                                 
17. Bator, supra note 3, at 1039. 
18. Id. 
19. Gunther, supra note 9, at 910. 
20. Id. at 911 (emphasizing “the value of uniformity that Supreme Court review now 
tends to assure”). 
21. Hart, supra note 1, at 1365. 
22. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Jurisdiction-Stripping Reconsidered, 96 Va. L. 
Rev. 1043, 1047 (2010) (noting “the originalist and textualist style of reasoning that has 
characterized nearly all leading academic writings on congressional control of 
jurisdiction”). Other scholarship, which does not focus solely on Supreme Court 
jurisdiction, likewise emphasizes the original meaning of Article III. See, e.g., Akhil Reed 
Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal 
Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. Rev. 205, 209, 240–46 (1985) (arguing, based on text, drafting 
history, and structure of Article III, Congress must give either Supreme Court or inferior 
federal courts jurisdiction over all cases arising under federal law); Robert N. Clinton, A 
Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Guided Quest for the Original 
Understanding of Article III, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 741, 749–50 (1984) (asserting Congress 
must “allocate to the federal judiciary as a whole . . . every type of case or controversy” 
listed in Article III, possibly excluding those “so trivial that they would pose an unnecessary 
burden”); Lawrence Gene Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term—Foreword: 
Constitutional Limitations on Congress’ Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the 
Federal Courts, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 17, 66 (1981) (contending, based on historical evidence, 
Congress must provide federal court review of constitutional claims). For a recent 
nonoriginalist analysis, see Fallon, supra, at 1048 (asserting “any modern assessment of 
Congress’s power . . . should ‘decenter’ originalist analysis under Article III . . . and rely 
[more] openly on . . . judicial precedent and functional desirability”). Like other scholars, 
however, Professor Fallon seems to rely primarily on judicial enforcement. 
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supremacy of federal law.23 Accordingly, he argues that Congress must 
leave in place “some avenue” for the Court to resolve “persistent conflicts 
between state and federal law or in the interpretation of federal law by 
lower courts.”24 
Scholars have recently supplemented these arguments by focusing 
on the structure of the judiciary. They assert that the Constitution creates 
a hierarchical judiciary and requires Congress to give the Supreme Court 
sufficient appellate jurisdiction to instruct inferior federal and state 
courts in the content of federal law.25 For example, several scholars rely 
on this judicial structure (as elucidated by Founding-era evidence) to 
claim that the Supreme Court must have the power to hear every federal 
question case. James Pfander contends that the Court must be able to 
review lower court decisions either on direct appeal or by issuing “super-
visory writs,” such as writs of habeas corpus or mandamus, in individual 
cases.26 Other commentators, including Steven Calabresi and Gary 
Lawson, argue that the Exceptions Clause, as originally understood, 
permits Congress only to transfer federal cases from the Court’s 
appellate to its original jurisdiction.27 (These scholars acknowledge that 
                                                                                                                 
23. Ratner, supra note 3, at 161–65 (“The nature of these essential Supreme Court 
functions is confirmed by the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention.”).  
24. Id. at 161. 
25. See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 3, at 837 (contending Congress must give Court 
“subject matter jurisdiction sufficiently broad to provide general leadership in defining 
federal law”). A few scholars, however, doubt that all lower courts must abide by Supreme 
Court precedent. See, e.g., id. at 837–38 (urging that inferior federal courts have such 
obligation, but doubting that “state courts [must] obey Supreme Court federal law 
precedents”); see also Michael Stokes Paulsen, Accusing Justice: Some Variations on the 
Themes of Robert M. Cover’s Justice Accused, 7 J.L. & Religion 33, 86–88 (1989) (arguing 
lower courts can initially disregard “clearly erroneous” constitutional interpretations). 
26. E.g., James E. Pfander, One Supreme Court: Supremacy, Inferiority, and the 
Judicial Power of the United States 25, 34–38 (2009); James E. Pfander, Federal 
Supremacy, State Court Inferiority, and the Constitutionality of Jurisdiction-Stripping 
Legislation, 101 Nw. U. L. Rev. 191, 236 (2007) (arguing “Congress must preserve a 
measure of supreme judicial oversight . . . sufficient to maintain the Court’s supremacy in 
relation to” state courts); James E. Pfander, Jurisdiction-Stripping and the Supreme 
Court’s Power to Supervise Inferior Tribunals, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1433, 1442–65, 1500 (2000) 
[hereinafter Pfander, Jurisdiction-Stripping] (discussing historical evidence and 
Founding-era understandings of terms “supreme” and “inferior” in Article III, arguing it 
would raise “serious constitutional questions” if Congress eliminated both Court’s 
appellate jurisdiction and authority to supervise lower federal courts by issuing 
discretionary writs). Professor Pfander has also recently explored the early Scottish 
judiciary to support this claim. James E. Pfander & Daniel D. Birk, Article III and the 
Scottish Judiciary, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 1613, 1619–20 (2011) (noting Scottish Court of 
Session retained at least supervisory control over lower courts and suggesting this system 
might have served as “a model to the Framers of Article III”). 
27. See Calabresi & Lawson, supra note 1, at 1016–42 (relying on eighteenth-century 
dictionary definition of “supreme” and “inferior” as well as original understanding of 
“court” and “tribunal” to interpret Congress’s power under Exceptions Clause); Claus, 
supra note 3, at 61, 81–97 (surveying historical evidence, including drafting history of 
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this position is at odds with the holding of Marbury v. Madison that 
Congress may not enlarge the size of the Court’s original jurisdiction.28) 
The above scholarship reflects certain shared assumptions. First, 
scholars agree that the Supreme Court has a crucial role in 
“pronounc[ing] uniform and authoritative rules of federal law.”29 
Second, scholars also seem to assume that the primary purpose of the 
Exceptions Clause is to enable Congress to remove classes of cases—
including federal cases—from the Court’s appellate oversight.30 Thus, 
scholars worry that any “plenary” congressional power under the Clause 
poses a serious threat to the Supreme Court’s central constitutional 
function.  
This Article argues that scholars have overlooked the ways in which 
Congress can use its broad exceptions power to protect the Supreme 
Court. Congress has repeatedly enacted “exceptions” and “regulations” 
that enabled the Court to “pronounce uniform and authoritative rules of 
federal law.”31  
B. The Exceptions Clause and the Supreme Court’s Settlement Function 
Article III establishes the power and independence of the federal 
judiciary and makes clear that the Supreme Court has a special role in 
the constitutional scheme. Although Article III gives Congress discretion 
as to whether to create inferior federal courts, it presumes the existence 
of “one supreme Court.”32 Article III also defines the scope of this one 
Supreme Court’s jurisdiction. The provision declares that “[t]he judicial 
                                                                                                                 
Article III as well as ratification debates, to support this construction of Exceptions 
Clause); Alex Glashausser, A Return to Form for the Exceptions Clause, 51 B.C. L. Rev. 
1383, 1390, 1397, 1403–12 (2010) (basing this conclusion on drafting history of Article 
III). 
28. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174–80 (1803); see also Calabresi & Lawson, supra note 1, 
at 1042–43 (noting Marbury’s inconsistency with historical interpretation of Exceptions 
Clause); Claus, supra note 3, at 107–09 (same); Glashausser, supra note 27, at 1390 
(same). 
29. Bator, supra note 3, at 1039; see also supra notes 16–24 and accompanying text 
(arguing Supreme Court’s role is to ensure uniformity in legal rules). 
30. See supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text (discussing historical 
interpretation of Exceptions Clause as allowing Congress to limit Supreme Court’s 
appellate jurisdiction); see also Pfander & Birk, supra note 26, at 1622 (noting 
“[c]onventional wisdom [among scholars] views this Exceptions and Regulations Clause as 
a plenary grant of authority to Congress to curtail virtually any aspect of the Court’s 
appellate role (subject to the requirement that Congress not overstep any other external 
constitutional limitations)”). 
31. Bator, supra note 3, at 1039. 
32. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested 
in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time 
ordain and establish.”); see also Redish, Congressional Power, supra note 12, at 901 
(“Unlike the lower federal courts, the Supreme Court’s existence is mandated by article 
III . . . .”). 
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Power . . . shall be vested in one supreme Court”33 and that this “judicial 
Power shall extend to all Cases” arising under federal law.34 Article III 
further provides that the Supreme Court “shall have appellate 
Jurisdiction” over such federal question cases.35 
If the jurisdictional provisions of Article III stopped at this point, it is 
not clear to what extent Congress could modify the Supreme Court’s 
jurisdiction.36 But Article III goes on to provide that the Court’s appellate 
review power is subject to “such Exceptions, and . . . such Regulations as 
the Congress shall make.”37 The unqualified language of the Exceptions 
Clause supports the view that Congress has broad authority over the 
Court’s appellate jurisdiction. Indeed, the Supreme Court itself has 
repeatedly adopted that construction of Congress’s exceptions power.38 
But it does not necessarily follow that any such plenary congressional 
power presents only a threat to the Court. Although scholars have repeat-
edly focused on the extent to which the Exceptions Clause enables 
Congress to strip the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction, it is not the 
sole function of the Clause. The Exceptions Clause is the primary source 
of authority for every federal statute affecting the Court’s appellate review 
power, including those with a more benign or beneficial effect.39 For 
example (as discussed further below), the Exceptions Clause authorized 
the creation of discretionary certiorari review—a “plenary power” that 
                                                                                                                 
33. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1 (emphasis added). 
34. Id. § 2, cl. 1 (emphasis added) (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases . . . 
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made . . . 
under their Authority . . . .”). 
35. Id. § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added). 
36. See Durousseau v. United States, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 307, 314 (1810) (stating 
“[t]he appellate powers of this court are not given by the judicial act” but instead “are 
given by the constitution” and when Congress purports to confer jurisdiction, it “must be 
understood as intending to execute the power . . . of making exceptions to the [Court’s] 
appellate jurisdiction”); infra notes 278–280 and accompanying text (discussing possibility, 
absent Exceptions Clause, Congress could not make even beneficial exceptions to Court’s 
appellate review power). 
37. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. 
38. See, e.g., The “Francis Wright,” 105 U.S. 381, 386 (1882) (“Not only may whole 
classes of cases be kept out of the [Supreme Court’s appellate] jurisdiction altogether, but 
particular classes of questions may be subjected to reexamination and review, while others 
are not.”); Daniels v. R.R. Co., 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 250, 254 (1866) (“[I]t is for Congress to 
determine how far . . . appellate jurisdiction shall be given . . . .”). 
39. The Exceptions Clause may work in conjunction with the Necessary and Proper 
Clause. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. But, at a minimum, the Exceptions Clause appears to give 
Congress a power over the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction that would not be 
provided by the Necessary and Proper Clause alone. See infra note 279 (discussing 
scholarship indicating Exceptions Clause gives Congress additional power over Court’s 
appellate jurisdiction).  
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Congress has repeatedly exercised at the request of the Supreme Court 
itself.40 
Thus, even if we assume that Congress has expansive power over the 
Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction, it does not tell us how Congress 
will use its authority. This Article asserts that Congress has an incentive to 
use—and has in fact often used—its exceptions power to facilitate what 
scholars view as the Supreme Court’s central constitutional role: 
resolving important federal questions. 
It may at first seem puzzling why Congress would ever exercise its 
power over federal jurisdiction to protect the Supreme Court (or any 
other part of the federal judiciary). Although legal scholars have rarely 
tackled that question,41 political scientists have offered various theories as 
to why politicians might support and empower courts. Scholars have 
argued, for example, that politicians may seek to advance a particular 
political agenda through judicial decisions,42 to delegate controversial 
                                                                                                                 
40. See infra Parts II–IV (discussing historical evidence showing Congress enacted 
certiorari jurisdiction at request of Court). Although scholars have rarely examined the 
constitutional source of the statutes establishing certiorari jurisdiction, a few have 
recognized that the power must stem from the Exceptions Clause. Thus, Herbert Wechsler 
observed in 1959 that certiorari review “rests upon the power that the Constitution vests in 
Congress to make exceptions to and regulate the Court’s appellate jurisdiction.” Herbert 
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 9 (1959). 
More recently, Kathryn Watts has asserted that discretionary certiorari review constitutes a 
delegation of Congress’s power under the Exceptions Clause. See Kathryn A. Watts, 
Constraining Certiorari Using Administrative Law Principles, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 23–24 
(2011) (arguing, although Congress could have specified “the cases that the Court must 
hear,” it “chose to delegate [that] policymaking power to the Court”). 
41. Only a few legal scholars have examined why politicians may support the 
judiciary. In one recent article, Professors Barry Friedman and Erin Delaney persuasively 
argue that the federalist structure of the Union may help explain the rise of judicial 
supremacy. They assert that political actors in the federal government initially supported 
judicial review of state and local government action because they expected the federal 
courts to keep states and localities in line with federal interests. Those same federal 
politicians later had difficulty explaining why the judiciary could not likewise review 
federal government action. See Barry Friedman & Erin F. Delaney, Becoming Supreme: 
The Federal Foundation of Judicial Supremacy, 111 Colum. L. Rev. 1137, 1140–41 (2011) 
(asserting “‘vertical supremacy’—the idea that judicial pronouncements govern the 
subnational units in a hierarchical system of government”—leads to “‘horizontal 
supremacy,’ in which the pronouncements of the high court are understood to bind the 
coordinate branches of the national government as well”); see also William M. Landes & 
Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & 
Econ. 875, 879, 894 (1975) (arguing political actors and interest groups may support 
independent judiciary to extent it enforces “the ‘deals’ made by effective interest groups 
with earlier legislatures”); infra note 44 (discussing arguments of Professors Mark 
Ramseyer and Matthew Stephenson on why political actors empower courts). 
42. See Keith E. Whittington, Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacy: The 
Presidency, the Supreme Court, and Constitutional Leadership in U.S. History 18 (2007) 
[hereinafter Whittington, Political Foundations] (“Political actors defer to . . . courts 
because the judiciary can be useful to their own political and constitutional goals . . . .”); 
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issues to the judiciary,43 or to use an independent judiciary as insurance 
against the risks of electoral loss.44 
The above theories suggest why political actors might support and 
empower any court. But one strand of social science literature known as 
“coordination theory” suggests why politicians might be inclined to 
empower the Supreme Court in particular—and, more specifically, why 
they might facilitate the Court’s role in settling disputed federal 
questions.45 Social scientists have argued that political actors establish 
(and later abide by) legal constraints because they contribute to 
economic and social stability.46 As social scientists have explained, most 
                                                                                                                 
Ran Hirschl, The Political Origins of Judicial Empowerment Through 
Constitutionalization: Lessons from Four Constitutional Revolutions, 25 Law & Soc. 
Inquiry 91, 116 (2000) (arguing political leaders will empower judiciary only if they have 
“a sufficient level of certainty . . . that the judiciary in general and the supreme court in 
particular are likely to produce decisions that . . . reflect their ideological preferences”); 
see also John M. De Figueiredo & Emerson H. Tiller, Congressional Control of the Courts: 
A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of Expansion of the Federal Judiciary, 39 J.L. & 
Econ. 435, 438, 460 (1996) (arguing Congress tends to expand size of judiciary “only when 
the nominating president and the confirming Senate are of the same political party as the 
enacting House and Senate”). 
43. See Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the 
Judiciary, 7 Stud. Am. Pol. Dev. 35, 36 (1993) (asserting “prominent elected officials 
consciously invite the judiciary to resolve” controversial issues); Keith E. Whittington, 
“Interpose Your Friendly Hand”: Political Supports for the Exercise of Judicial Review by 
the United States Supreme Court, 99 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 583, 584 (2005) (“The 
establishment and maintenance of judicial review is a way of delegating some kinds of 
political decisions to a relatively politically insulated institution.”). 
44. Professors Mark Ramseyer and Matthew Stephenson have argued that, in a 
politically competitive society, risk-averse politicians favor an independent judiciary as a 
useful means of controlling their political opponents during periods when their own side 
is out of power. See J. Mark Ramseyer, The Puzzling (In)Dependence of Courts: A 
Comparative Approach, 23 J. Legal Stud. 721, 722, 741–42 (1994) (arguing, in countries 
like United States, “politicians offer independent courts” because “politicians in both 
parties expect the electoral system to continue, but no one gives either party high odds of 
controlling the government indefinitely”); Matthew C. Stephenson, “When the Devil 
Turns . . . ”: The Political Foundations of Independent Judicial Review, 32 J. Legal Stud. 
59, 63–64, 71–73 (2003) (“[I]ndependent judicial review allows parties to minimize the 
risks associated with political competition. Respecting judicial independence may require 
the party that currently controls the government to sacrifice some policy objectives, but it 
also means that when that party is out of power, its opponent faces similar limitations.”). 
Thus, the faction in power will often adhere to an adverse judicial decision, with the 
expectation that its opponents will do the same when they are in control. Each political 
faction relies on the judiciary as a long-term check on its political opponents. See 
Ramseyer, supra, at 742 (suggesting “implicit cooperation” between competing politicians 
often restrains them from challenging judicial independence). 
45. For a foundational work on coordination theory, see generally Thomas C. 
Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (1980 ed. 1960). 
46. See Russell Hardin, Liberalism, Constitutionalism, and Democracy 18, 86 (1999) 
[hereinafter Hardin, Liberalism] (asserting “[i]n an even moderately diverse society, 
stability . . . depends on separate coordinations of various groups,” and arguing Constitu-
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political and economic transactions involve some unforeseen contin-
gencies.47 Many such transactions would be “too costly to undertake” if 
the participants could not rely on some mechanism for resolving the in-
evitable disputes over those future events.48 Legal institutions provide a 
means of resolving such disputes because they establish legal rules that 
clarify the boundaries of permissible conduct.49 These legal rules serve as 
focal points around which the relevant parties can coordinate their 
actions.50 
Social scientists have used coordination theory to explain the im-
portance of various legal institutions. For example, political scientist 
Russell Hardin argues that the U.S. Constitution was “a successful 
coordination” of competing state and regional interests “at its core.”51 
Other scholars have explored the ways in which judicial decisions allow 
parties to coordinate their actions.52 Geoffrey Garrett and Barry Weingast 
                                                                                                                 
tion offers stability in this sense, because it “establishes conventions . . . that make it easier 
for us to cooperate and to coordinate in particular moments”); Barry R. Weingast, The 
Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law, 91 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 245, 246 
(1997) (“Democratic stability occurs when citizens and elites construct a focal solution that 
resolves their coordination dilemmas about limits on the state.”). 
47. See, e.g., David M. Kreps, Corporate Culture and Economic Theory, in 
Perspectives on Positive Political Economy 90, 92 (James E. Alt & Kenneth A. Shepsle eds., 
1990) (“[I]n many transactions, in particular ongoing ones, contingencies typically arise 
that were unforeseen at the time of the transaction itself.”). 
48. Id. 
49. See Weingast, supra note 46, at 246 (arguing certain legal institutions, including 
“successful pacts—such as the Glorious Revolution in seventeenth-century England[] 
[and] the Missouri Compromise of 1820 . . . —create a focal solution that resolves the 
coordination dilemmas confronting elites and citizens”); see also Geoffrey Garrett & Barry 
R. Weingast, Ideas, Interests, and Institutions: Constructing the European Community’s 
Internal Market, in Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change 
173, 197 (Judith Goldstein & Robert O. Keohane eds., 1993) (“[A] central objective of 
actors wishing to engage in stable cooperation in complex environments is the 
construction of institutions that monitor the behavior of participants, identify 
transgressions, and apply the general rules of the game to myriad unanticipated 
contingencies.”). 
50. See Weingast, supra note 46, at 246 (arguing certain legal institutions “create a 
focal solution that resolves the coordination dilemmas confronting elites and citizens”). 
51. Hardin, Liberalism, supra note 46, at 88 (arguing Constitution was primarily 
designed to resolve economic disputes among states by creating central government with 
power to regulate interstate commerce). A few legal scholars have likewise recognized that 
the constitutional text provides crucial focal points for political actors and citizens. See 
Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional 
Commitment, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 657, 708 (2011) (“Coordination offers an especially 
perspicacious explanation of the ongoing relevance of the big-C Constitution.”); David A. 
Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 877, 934 (1996) 
(arguing “[t]he written text does play a crucial role as a focal point”). 
52. See, e.g., Zachary Elkins et al., The Endurance of National Constitutions 108 
(2009) (asserting “[i]f the constitution is vague on a certain point, . . . [c]onstitutional 
review provides focal points for enforcement”). 
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contend that international tribunals can help countries police their 
treaty partners by clarifying when other nations have violated their treaty 
commitments.53 They argue that “governments no longer need to . . . 
determine whether a particular action constitutes a transgression. 
Instead, they need only observe the pronouncements of the courts.”54 
Notably, such a coordination regime tends to become more en-
trenched over time.55 That is because once the regime is in place it 
becomes “extremely difficult to re-coordinate large numbers on doing 
things some other way.”56 Not only must a large number of citizens and 
political actors object to the old regime, but a sufficient number must 
also agree on the same alternative.57 Thus, Professor Hardin argues, “The 
Constitution of 1787 worked in the end because enough of the relevant 
people worked within its confines long enough to get it established in 
everyone’s expectations that there was no point in not working within its 
confines.”58 
The above social science literature suggests why political actors may 
be inclined to facilitate the Supreme Court’s role in defining the content 
of federal law. The Supreme Court performs a crucial settlement 
function for disputed federal questions.59 Although some constitutional 
                                                                                                                 
53. See Garrett & Weingast, supra note 49, at 197–98 (explaining how European 
courts help nations identify and monitor treaty violations). 
54. Id. at 198. 
55. See John M. Carey, Parchment, Equilibria, and Institutions, 33 Comp. Pol. Stud. 
735, 754 (2000) (asserting “if institutions are products of coordination . . . then institu-
tional equilibria are sticky”). 
56. Hardin, Liberalism, supra note 46, at 15. 
57. Russell Hardin, Why a Constitution?, in The Federalist Papers and the New 
Institutionalism 100, 113 (Bernard Grofman & Donald Wittman eds., 1989) (asserting 
“once we have settled on a constitutional arrangement, it is not likely to be in the interest 
of some of us then to try to renege” and “[t]o do better, we would have to carry enough 
others with us to set up an alternative, and that will typically be too costly to be worth the 
effort”). Although social scientists do not appear to have identified the precise conditions 
under which such a recoordination can occur, they do agree that such regime changes are 
rare. See Hardin, Liberalism, supra note 46, at 15 (noting “[i]t took the massive politics of 
1787–8 . . . to devise the constitutional order of the United States”); Weingast, supra note 
46, at 261 (asserting “a society cannot establish a coordination device at just any time” and 
“[b]reaking [the prior] equilibrium is difficult and requires something exogenous to the 
model,” such as crisis or major economic or demographic changes). 
58. Hardin, Liberalism, supra note 46, at 136; see also Weingast, supra note 46, at 254 
(noting “U.S. constitutional restrictions on elected officials are self-enforcing,” in part 
“because citizens are willing to defend [the Constitution] by reacting against proposed 
violations” and, “[a]nticipating that reaction, political leaders rarely attempt violations”). 
59. Other scholars have recognized that the Court performs a crucial settlement 
function—at least in the context of constitutional law. See Larry Alexander & Frederick 
Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1359, 1385 
(1997) (emphasizing Supreme Court’s role “as the authoritative settler of constitutional 
meaning”). Notably, this Article does not mean to suggest that political actors empower 
the Supreme Court solely to promote its settlement function. Social scientists have 
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or statutory questions may be answered by the President, Congress, or 
administrative agencies, many legal issues are left to the courts.60 Lower 
courts (particularly the federal courts of appeals and state supreme 
courts) can specify the boundaries of permissible conduct within their 
respective jurisdictions. But only the Supreme Court can provide a defin-
itive and nationally uniform resolution of federal law.61 
Political actors thus have some reason to promote the Supreme 
Court’s settlement function. Moreover, these political incentives are 
likely to increase over time, as the Court’s role becomes more en-
trenched. Over the past two centuries, both Congress and the general 
public have grown increasingly accustomed to the Supreme Court’s role 
in providing a definitive and uniform resolution of federal questions.62 
That is true—not because Supreme Court decisions necessarily provide 
the best resolution of disputed issues, but because “enough of the 
relevant people [have] worked within [this judicial system] long enough 
to get it established in everyone’s expectations”63 that the Court has a 
crucial role in defining the content of federal law. Congress should 
therefore be increasingly inclined to enact “exceptions” and 
“regulations” that facilitate the Court’s role. 
This theory finds support in the history of congressional control over 
the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction. As discussed in Parts II–IV, 
Congress has not generally used its authority to restrict the Court’s 
                                                                                                                 
identified other reasons that politicians empower the judiciary as a whole. See supra notes 
41–44 and accompanying text (discussing political science literature). But coordination 
theory does help explain why politicians support the Supreme Court in particular—even 
when they strongly disagree with its jurisprudence. All political actors benefit from the 
Court’s role in establishing definitive and uniform rules of federal law. 
60. Indeed, some social scientists argue that political actors deliberately defer 
controversial matters to the judiciary. See supra note 43 (discussing political science 
scholarship making this argument). 
61. Some legal scholars have recognized that Supreme Court decisions can provide 
focal points for decisionmaking. See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional 
Showdowns, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 991, 999 (2008) (observing “[p]recedents may create focal 
points that coordinate behavior” and “constitutional ‘precedent’ . . . may, but need not, be 
a judicial precedent”). But see Richard H. McAdams, Beyond the Prisoners’ Dilemma: 
Coordination, Game Theory, and Law, 82 S. Cal. L. Rev. 209, 240–41 (2009) (stating “few 
constitutional law scholars [have] examine[d] focal point theory”). 
62. See Gregory A. Caldeira & James L. Gibson, The Etiology of Public Support for 
the Supreme Court, 36 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 635, 658 (1992) (asserting, based on empirical 
study, modern Supreme Court enjoys “diffuse support” among mass public); Neal Devins, 
The Majoritarian Rehnquist Court?, Law & Contemp. Probs., Summer 2004, at 63, 70 
(“Today’s Congress . . . rarely casts doubt on either the correct-ness of [a Supreme Court] 
ruling or, more fundamentally, the Court’s power to authoritatively interpret the 
Constitution.”); Richard H. Pildes, Is the Supreme Court a “Majoritarian” Institution?, 
2010 Sup. Ct. Rev. 103, 145 (“That the power and stature of the Court have increased 
dramatically over time is widely recognized.”). 
63. Hardin, Liberalism, supra note 46, at 136. 
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appellate review power but instead has steadily expanded it. These juris-
dictional expansions, however, had an adverse impact: They created a 
series of workload crises at the Supreme Court that undermined its 
capacity to provide a definitive resolution of federal questions.64 The 
Court called upon Congress to provide relief and, each time, Congress 
responded by exercising its authority under the Exceptions Clause. In a 
series of statutes, Congress made “exceptions” to the Court’s mandatory 
appellate jurisdiction and replaced it with discretionary review via writs of 
certiorari.65 
Notably, the political support for these exceptions was reasonably 
widespread and increased over time. This broad political support was 
rather remarkable, because each of the statutes governing certiorari juris-
diction was enacted during an era of intense conflict over the federal ju-
diciary. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, populists 
and progressives sought to curtail the power of the probusiness judiciary, 
while economic conservatives steadfastly defended the courts. In more 
modern times, social conservatives took aim at the Court’s progressive 
civil rights jurisprudence, while social progressives sought to protect the 
courts.66  
Nevertheless, both sides were willing to support measures that pro-
tected the Supreme Court’s settlement function. Thus, in 1891, a group 
of key progressives joined economic conservatives to support the creation 
of certiorari review in order to safeguard the Court’s role in 
“enforc[ing]” the “uniformity of decision” on legal questions.67 In the 
early twentieth century, an even larger number of progressives joined the 
conservatives to significantly expand the Court’s discretionary certiorari 
jurisdiction.68 Finally, in a series of statutes throughout the 1970s, 
culminating in the Judiciary Act of 1988,69 Congress gave the Court 
                                                                                                                 
64. See infra notes 109–113, 220–222 and accompanying text (describing caseload 
crises in federal judiciary in nineteenth and twentieth centuries). 
65. See S. Rep. No. 100-300, at 3 (1988) (“In establishing the Court’s appellate 
jurisdiction under Article III, Congress can confer as much or as little compulsory 
jurisdiction as it deems necessary and proper, including such exceptions as Congress thinks 
appropriate.” (emphasis added)); S. Rep. No. 96-35, at 2–3 (1979) (“[A]n ‘appeal’ to any 
Federal appellate court, including the Supreme Court, is solely a creature of legislative 
choice. . . . If Congress wants to make the Court’s appellate jurisdiction totally discretion-
ary or totally obligatory in nature, nothing in the Constitution says ‘no.’” (citations 
omitted)). 
66. See Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Safeguards of Federal Jurisdiction, 124 
Harv. L. Rev. 869, 888–916 (2011) [hereinafter Grove, Structural Safeguards] (describing 
Congress’s jurisdiction-stripping efforts after Civil War). 
67. 21 Cong. Rec. 3405 (1890) (statement of Rep. David Culberson, D-Tex.) 
68. See infra notes 209–214 and accompanying text (noting support from 
progressives for certiorari expansion in Judiciary Act of 1925). 
69. Act of June 27, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-352, §§ 2–4, 102 Stat. 662, 662–63 (codified 
at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254, 1257–58 (2006)). 
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certiorari review over virtually every appeal. These statutes had broad 
support among both social conservatives and social progressives; the 1988 
Act was enacted with no recorded dissent.70 By 1988, virtually all legis-
lators seemed to view the Supreme Court’s “principal functions” as 
“resolv[ing]” important issues of federal law and “ensur[ing] uni-
formity . . . in the law by resolving conflicts” among the lower courts.71 
Thus, Congress enacted “exceptions” that safeguarded the Supreme 
Court’s power to “pronounce uniform and authoritative rules of federal 
law.”72 
At the outset, however, it is important to note a few qualifications 
and clarifications about this argument. First, this Article does not assert 
that Congress can only use its exceptions power to protect the Supreme 
Court. On the contrary (as discussed in Part V), the Article acknowledges 
that Congress has the raw power to strip the Court’s appellate jurisdic-
tion over certain classes of claims, as it has done on a few occasions. But 
the Article suggests that the incentives of Congress—combined with 
other structural and political constraints (which are described further in 
Part V)—help explain why such uses of the Exceptions Clause have been 
rare. 
Second, the Article does not seek to defend the Supreme Court’s 
exercise of its discretionary review power.73 Instead, the focus here is on 
why Congress created and expanded the Court’s certiorari jurisdiction. 
As described below, it appears that Congress sought in large part to facili-
tate the Court’s role in resolving federal questions.74 That is not to say 
that every Supreme Court decision in fact provides a definitive resolution 
of a disputed federal question. Although many Court decisions serve this 
function,75 other opinions are written narrowly and resolve only the 
                                                                                                                 
70. See infra note 261 and accompanying text (noting there was no expressed 
opposition to granting Supreme Court certiorari jurisdiction over most appeals). 
71. H.R. Rep. No. 100-660, at 14 (1988). 
72. Bator, supra note 3, at 1039. 
73. The Supreme Court’s certiorari jurisdiction has been severely criticized by some 
scholars. See, e.g., Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-
Five Years After the Judges’ Bill, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1643, 1647 (2000) (doubting whether 
Court’s certiorari power can be reconciled with “classic conceptions of judicial review, 
judicial power, and the rule of law”); see also Amanda L. Tyler, Setting the Supreme 
Court’s Agenda: Is There a Place for Certification?, 78 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1310, 1310 
(2010) (noting many critics claim either “the Court is taking too few cases” or “the Court is 
not taking the ‘right’ cases”). 
74. See infra Parts III–V (describing efforts by Congress to assist Court through 
expansion of certiorari jurisdiction). 
75. Notably, such broad decisions need not be “activist.” Although some Court 
decisions clarify the content of federal law by limiting the scope of governmental power, 
other broad decisions require lower courts to defer to the political branches. Compare 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444–45 (1966) (requiring police to give specific 
warnings before interrogating any suspect in custody), and Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 
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particular case before the Court.76 Nevertheless, as many political actors 
have recognized, the Supreme Court is the only judicial institution that 
can provide a nationally uniform resolution of federal questions. It is this 
potential settlement function that Congress can facilitate in exercising its 
power over federal jurisdiction. 
Third, the Article does not mean to suggest that all political actors 
supported the creation and expansion of certiorari jurisdiction solely to 
promote the Court’s settlement function. There were undoubtedly 
multiple motivations for these laws. For example, political supporters of 
the judiciary (probusiness conservatives in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries and social progressives in more modern times) likely 
sought in part to enhance the Court’s power to issue decisions they 
favored.77 But coordination theory does help explain why even political 
opponents of the judiciary agreed to these certiorari measures. Such 
opponents had few short-term incentives to empower the Supreme 
Court. But both supporters and opponents of the judiciary would benefit 
from the Court’s long-term role in providing focal points around which 
government actors and citizens could organize their affairs. 
Finally, the goal here is not to demonstrate that the Exceptions 
Clause was originally designed to protect the Supreme Court’s role in 
settling federal questions. In fact, that is one way in which the approach 
of this Article differs from prior literature on Congress’s power over 
federal jurisdiction, virtually all of which seeks to unearth the original 
meaning of Article III.78 
The historical survey below suggests instead that Congress’s author-
ity under the Exceptions Clause has been defined over time, as the 
Supreme Court’s constitutional role has become more entrenched and 
as the need for certain exceptions (like discretionary certiorari review) 
has become apparent. Legislators have gradually come to accept—
indeed, to depend upon—the Court’s role in providing an authoritative 
and uniform resolution of federal questions. For that reason, Congress 
has used its broad authority under the Exceptions Clause to safeguard 
the Supreme Court’s Article III judicial power. 
                                                                                                                 
568 (1964) (establishing one-person, one-vote rule for legislative apportionment), with 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984) 
(requiring deference to administrative interpretations of ambiguous statutes), and Hodel 
v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 331–32 (1981) (requiring rational basis review of economic 
legislation). 
76. See Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Case for Vertical Maximalism, 95 Cornell L. 
Rev. 1, 11–21 (2009) (describing recent “minimalist” rulings by Supreme Court). 
77. See supra notes 41–44 and accompanying text (discussing reasons politicians may 
support judiciary). 
78. See supra notes 22–24 and accompanying text (discussing prior scholarship on 
jurisdiction stripping that relied on originalism to ascertain meaning of Article III).  
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II. EXPANSIONS AND EXCEPTIONS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA 
From 1789 until the Civil War, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court 
was governed—with few modifications—by the Judiciary Act of 1789.79 
This statute reflected Congress’s early (and rather limited) under-
standing of the Supreme Court’s constitutional role. The first Congress 
viewed the Court primarily as a forum for resolving disputes among the 
states and ensuring state court compliance with federal law.80 Accord-
ingly, under the 1789 Act, the Court had the power to review all state 
court decisions denying federal rights but no authority over other state 
court rulings on federal questions.81 The Court had even less power to 
oversee the inferior federal courts.82 
However, as discussed below (and in Part III), by the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, legislators began to develop a more 
expansive conception of the Supreme Court’s role. The Court was 
increasingly viewed as an institution that should establish definitive and 
uniform rules of federal law.83 Thus, legislators described the Supreme 
Court as “the final tribunal which should pass upon the meaning of the 
                                                                                                                 
79. See Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 
1789, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 49, 131 (1923) (observing that, during first eighty-six years, 
Judiciary Act of 1789 had minor modifications). 
80. Thus, in 1789, there was widespread political support for Supreme Court review 
of state court decisions. Nationalists were worried that state courts might interfere with the 
operations of the new government. See 1 Annals of Cong. 797–98 (1789) (Joseph Gales 
ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. William Smith, Pro-Admin.-S.C.) (urging it was 
“indispensable” to have appeal from every state court decision involving federal law). 
States’ rights advocates hoped the Court would keep the national government within its 
prescribed bounds and also police the actions of sister states. See, e.g., id. at 809 
(statement of Rep. Michael Stone, Anti-Admin.-Md.) (asserting Framers “supposed that 
[the federal government] had a natural tendency to destroy the State Governments [or] 
that the State Governments had a tendency to abridge the powers of the General 
Government; therefore it was necessary to guard against either . . . and this was to be done 
properly by establishing” the “Supreme Federal Court”). For the party affiliations of 
members of Congress, this Article relies on Congress’s online database, Biographical 
Directory of the United States Congress: 1774–Present, http://bioguide.congress.gov/
biosearch/biosearch.asp, (last visited April 23, 2013).  
81. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85–87.  
82. Under the 1789 Act, the lower federal courts could hear admiralty and maritime 
cases, suits arising under international or federal criminal law, and diversity actions when 
the amount in controversy exceeded $500. Id. §§ 2–4, 9, 11, 1 Stat. at 73–79. The Court 
could review those decisions when the amount in controversy exceeded $2,000. Id. §§ 13–
14, 1 Stat. at 80–82, 84–85. The Court could also review some lower federal court decisions 
through its power to issue supervisory writs, such as writs of mandamus and habeas corpus. 
Id.  
83. See infra notes 147–148 and accompanying text (describing how Congress valued 
Court’s ability to provide consistent judicial rules). 
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Constitution, treaties, and statutes of the United States”84 in order to 
“enforc[e]” uniform decisions “throughout the entire judicial system.”85  
This conception of the Court’s role is nicely illustrated by the 
debates surrounding the Judiciary Act of 1891.86 That statute trans-
formed the appellate review scheme created in 1789. Under the 1789 
Act, the Supreme Court had only limited appellate jurisdiction but was 
required to review every case that came before it on appeal. The 1891 Act 
(along with other reforms of the late nineteenth century) dramatically 
expanded the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction but also created 
discretionary certiorari review. This discretionary review system was 
designed to ensure that the Court could establish uniform rules in a 
broader class of federal cases.87 
Notably, the 1891 Act was enacted during an era that was character-
ized by intense partisan struggles over the authority of the federal courts. 
While economic conservatives sought to expand and protect federal juris-
diction, populists and progressives generally fought to curtail it. But even 
during this era of intense partisanship, these political factions proved to 
be less divided when it came to the Supreme Court. A group of key 
                                                                                                                 
84. 52 Cong. Rec. 276 (1914) (statement of Rep. Edwin Webb, D-N.C.); see also, e.g., 
21 Cong. Rec. 3405 (1890) (statement of Rep. David Culberson, D-Tex.) (“As the Supreme 
Court is the Federal head of the judicial department of the Government, it would appear 
illogical and improper to exclude from it questions of a Federal character . . . .”). 
85. 21 Cong. Rec. 3405 (1890) (statement of Rep. David Culberson, D-Tex.); see also, 
e.g., 48 Cong. Rec. 6012 (1912) (statement of Sen. Elihu Root, R-N.Y.) (“The sole object of 
the [1914 law extending review over state court appeals] . . . is to make it possible for the 
Supreme Court to pass upon Federal questions so as to have uniformity of law.”). At the 
same time (and relatedly), political actors were increasingly willing to accept the Court’s 
role in resolving constitutional controversies. See Barry Friedman, The History of the 
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 333, 431 (1998) (asserting, by late nineteenth century, people “were beginning to 
understand their need for a Supreme Court” to resolve constitutional questions). 
86. See infra Part II.B (discussing Act and surrounding controversy). 
87. Notably, the Court’s appellate jurisdiction was established by Article III. 
Accordingly, when the first Congress in the 1789 Act declined to grant the Court 
jurisdiction in all federal cases, it made exception to the Court’s preexisting constitutional 
jurisdiction. See Durousseau v. United States, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 307, 314 (1810) (“When 
the first legislature of the union proceeded to carry the third article of the constitution 
into effect, they must be understood as intending to execute the power they possessed of 
making exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court.”). As already 
mentioned, this Article does not argue that Congress in 1789 sought to use its exceptions 
power to promote the Court’s settlement function; Congress at that time had a much 
narrower conception of the Supreme Court’s role. See supra text accompanying notes 79–
82 (noting First Congress’s understood Court’s role to be settling state disputes and 
guaranteeing adherence to federal law). Congress’s subsequent jurisdictional “expansions” 
could thus be characterized as “restorations” of the Court’s Article III jurisdiction. For the 
purposes of this Article, the characterization makes little difference. Whether Congress 
was expanding or restoring the Court’s jurisdiction, it was doing so in order to facilitate 
the Court’s settlement function. 
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progressives crossed party lines to vote in favor of legislation designed to 
protect the Court’s role in overseeing the judiciary. 
A. Partisan Divides and Jurisdiction-Stripping Efforts 
The political parties of the late nineteenth century were internally 
cohesive and sharply at odds with their political opponents.88 By the mid-
1870s, the Republican Party was dominated by economic conservatives, 
whose primary goal was to build a strong national economy by encour-
aging industrial development and powerful corporations.89 The 
Democrats, by contrast, represented more populist and progressive 
voters, and opposed many of the Republicans’ procorporate policies.90  
The economic conservatives sought to advance their agenda in large 
part through the federal judiciary.91 The Republicans controlled the 
presidency and the Senate during much of this period and were thus 
able to appoint judges who were generally sympathetic to the party’s 
economic goals.92 Indeed, the members of the Supreme Court were 
selected almost entirely based on “their devotion to party principles and 
‘soundness’ on the major economic questions of the day.”93 
                                                                                                                 
88. See William N. Chambers, Party Development and the American Mainstream, in 
The American Party Systems: Stages of Political Development 3, 14 (William Nisbet 
Chambers & Walter Dean Burnham eds., 2d ed. 1975) (noting “party loyalties [were 
brought] to a pitch of almost military fervor and discipline”). 
89. In the immediate aftermath of the Civil War, the Republican Party focused more 
on civil rights (i.e., protecting free blacks in the South from abuses). See William M. 
Wiecek, The Reconstruction of Federal Judicial Power, 1863–1875, 13 Am. J. Legal Hist. 
333, 333, 344 (1969) (observing federal courts’ enlarged removal and habeas jurisdictions 
were originally designed to allow them to “protect[] the rights of Negroes and federal 
officials in the South”). However, the political support for civil rights enforcement waned 
in the 1870s, and the Republicans turned instead toward building a strong national 
economy. See Howard Gillman, How Political Parties Can Use the Courts to Advance 
Their Agendas: Federal Courts in the United States, 1875–1891, 96 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 511, 
516 (2002) (asserting, “despite a spate of [pro-civil rights] activity culminating in the 
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, by the mid-1870s the national enthusiasm for the 
vigorous protection of civil rights was diminishing,” and Republican party began to 
“increasingly . . . focus on nationalism, and especially economic nationalism”).  
90. See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Litigation and Inequality: Federal Diversity Jurisdiction 
in Industrial America, 1870–1958, at 15 (1992) (asserting, during this period, Democrats 
represented interests in Midwest, West, and South that were increasingly “hostil[e] to 
eastern financial interests and national corporations”). 
91. Gillman, supra note 89, at 513, 516–17 (arguing Republicans sought to make 
federal judges “principal agents of [Republicans’ economic] agenda”). 
92. See Richard Franklin Bensel, The Political Economy of American 
Industrialization, 1877–1900, at 7 (2000) (noting Supreme Court appointees supported 
economic agenda of Republican party); Barry Friedman, The Will of the People: How 
Public Opinion Has Influenced the Supreme Court and Shaped the Meaning of the 
Constitution 159–60 (2009) (“The priority of business thus became to ensure a federal 
bench, and particularly a Supreme Court, that was ‘sound’ on the issues that mattered.”). 
93. Bensel, supra note 92, at 7. 
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The Republicans endeavored to empower this “friendly” judiciary by 
expanding federal jurisdiction. During a period of unified government,94 
the party ushered in a sweeping jurisdictional statute. The Judiciary Act 
of 1875 enabled the federal courts to hear all cases arising under federal 
law and significantly expanded their jurisdiction in diversity suits, 
including the opportunities to remove cases from state to federal court.95 
The Act had the desired effect: Corporations soon took advantage of 
their opportunities to take cases to the federal courts, leading to an 
explosion in federal litigation.96 
The 1875 Act also precipitated a bitter partisan struggle over federal 
jurisdiction.97 For the next several decades, Democratic legislators pro-
posed bills to curb federal jurisdiction over suits involving corporations. 
Representative David Culberson led the charge from the 1870s to the 
1890s.98 He repeatedly proposed legislation that would define a corpora-
tion as a citizen of any state in which it did business, thereby largely elim-
inating federal diversity jurisdiction over common law actions involving 
corporations.99 Representative Culberson emphasized that “[p]ersons 
who are poor and without the means to litigate with wealthy corporations 
are . . . denied justice” in federal court.100 He argued, “There can be no 
                                                                                                                 
94. 5 Historical Statistics of the United States: Earliest Times to the Present 5-201 
tbl.Eb296-308 (Susan B. Carter et al. eds., millennial ed. 2006) [hereinafter Historical 
Statistics] (showing, from 1873 to 1875, Republicans had 194-92 majority in House, 49-19 
majority in Senate, and held presidency in Ulysses S. Grant).  
95. See Judiciary Act of 1875, ch. 137, §§ 1–2, 18 Stat. 470, 470–71 (conferring 
jurisdiction over “all suits . . . arising under” federal law when amount in controversy 
exceeded $500, and expanding diversity jurisdiction). 
96. See Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court: A 
Study in the Federal Judicial System 60–65 (Transaction Publishers 2007) (1928) (noting 
various statutes, especially Judiciary Act of 1875, contributed to rise in federal courts’ 
caseload); Purcell, supra note 90, at 15 (discussing statutes expanding federal jurisdiction, 
culminating “in the Judiciary Act of 1875[,] which pushed the reach of the federal courts 
toward their outer constitutional limits”). 
97. See Purcell, supra note 90, at 15 (“Beginning in 1878, [populists and 
progressives] mounted a persistent campaign to restrict the federal courts, prevent 
corporate removals, and limit diversity jurisdiction.”). 
98. See 23 Cong. Rec. 200 (1892) (introducing bill “to limit the jurisdiction of the 
district and circuit courts”); 15 Cong. Rec. 118 (1883) (proposing amendment to regulate 
removal of causes from state courts to federal courts); 13 Cong. Rec. 427 (1882) (same); 
10 Cong. Rec. 43 (1879) (same); 7 Cong. Rec. 4000 (1878) (proposing bill “to regulate the 
removal of cases from the State courts” to federal courts).  
99. See 10 Cong. Rec. 681–82 (1880) (introducing bill stripping circuit courts of 
original jurisdiction “of any suit . . . between a corporation . . . and a citizen of any State” 
in which such corporation conducted business, and preventing removal of such cases “to 
any circuit court of the United States”). 
100. Id. at 702 (statement of Rep. David Culberson, D-Tex.); see also id. at 1015 
(statement of Rep. James Waddill, D-Mo.) (complaining similarly about inability of poor 
plaintiffs, including widows and children, to receive justice against corporations in federal 
court). 
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higher duty imposed on this Congress than to lessen [the] power [of 
corporations] to oppress the citizen in the courts of the United States.”101 
The Republicans reacted by defending the federal judiciary and 
underscoring its importance to the nation’s economic growth and devel-
opment.102 For example, Representative Hiram Barber argued that 
“[c]apital [in the North and East] is timid; it demands security,” and the 
“best guarantee of security to investments [is] found in recourse to the 
national courts.”103 Likewise, Representative George Robinson empha-
sized the importance of ensuring a federal forum for large corporations, 
stating, “[L]et us stand by the national courts; let us preserve their 
power.”104 
These jurisdiction-stripping bills repeatedly passed the House of 
Representatives,105 which was controlled by the Democratic Party during 
much of this period.106 Each time, however, the Republicans used their 
control over the Senate to block the proposal.107 Thus, as Representative 
Culberson complained in 1890, “[T]he fate of [this jurisdiction-
stripping] measure in the Senate . . . warns us that it can never become 
the law.”108 
B. The Introduction of Certiorari Review: 1891 
The rise in litigation resulting from the 1875 Judiciary Act and other 
contemporaneous reforms created a caseload crisis throughout the 
federal judiciary.109 But the situation in the Supreme Court was particu-
larly severe. The Court’s appellate jurisdiction was still largely defined by 
the Judiciary Act of 1789, which required it to review every case properly 
                                                                                                                 
101. 14 Cong. Rec. 1246 (1883) (statement of Rep. David Culberson, D-Tex.). 
102. Grove, Structural Safeguards, supra note 66, at 895. 
103. 10 Cong. Rec. 820 (1880) (statement of Rep. Hiram Barber, Jr., R-Ill.). 
104. Id. at 850 (statement of Rep. George Robinson, R-Mass.). 
105. See Grove, Structural Safeguards, supra note 66, at 934 (showing results of 
House votes on jurisdiction-stripping bills introduced in 1880 and 1883). 
106. See Historical Statistics, supra note 94, at 5-201 tbl.Eb296-308 (noting 
Democrats controlled House for six of ten Congresses spanning from 1871 to 1891). 
107. See Grove, Structural Safeguards, supra note 66, at 893–96 (describing political 
battles over jurisdiction stripping during this period).  
108. 21 Cong. Rec. 3406 (1890) (statement of Rep. David Culberson, D-Tex.); see 
also 26 Cong. Rec. 8594 (1894) (statement of Rep. David Culberson, D-Tex.) (lamenting 
that, although his bill had passed through House in multiple Congresses, that body had 
never “been able to get the concurrence of the Senate in this measure”). 
109. See supra note 96 and accompanying text (discussing higher caseload in wake of 
expansion of federal jurisdiction under 1875 Act); see also Wiecek, supra note 89, at 342–
48 (describing expansion of federal habeas jurisdiction in nineteenth century); infra Part 
V.B.1 (discussing repeal and restoration of Supreme Court jurisdiction over certain habeas 
appeals).  
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before it on appeal.110 This mandatory appellate review scheme was 
sustainable during the Court’s early years, when it heard at most 250 
cases per year.111 But by 1890, the Court’s mandatory appellate docket 
had swelled to over 1,800 cases,112 only four or five hundred of which it 
could dispose of in a given year.113 
Chief Justice Morrison Waite urged Congress to use its authority 
under the Exceptions Clause to provide relief to the Court.114 He empha-
sized that the Supreme Court’s “appellate jurisdiction is subject entirely 
to congressional control. It may be more or it may be less, as the ever-
changing circumstances of a great and growing country shall require.”115 
Although he declined to suggest “what [the] relief shall be,” he sought 
legislation that would “help to make the Supreme Court what its name 
implies, a powerful auxiliary in the administration of justice,” rather than 
“an obstacle standing in the way” of the final resolution of cases.116 
Members of the executive branch echoed Chief Justice Waite’s calls 
for reform. Attorneys General under both Democratic President Grover 
Cleveland and Republican President Benjamin Harrison urged Congress 
to “find a remedy for the crying evil of delay” caused by the caseload 
crisis.117 President Harrison raised the issue himself in his 1889 State of 
                                                                                                                 
110. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 73, 81 (stating Court “shall . . . 
have appellate jurisdiction from the circuit courts and courts of the several states”); 
Eugene Gressman, Requiem for the Supreme Court’s Obligatory Jurisdiction, 65 A.B.A. J. 
1325, 1327 (1979) (“From 1789 to 1891 the Court was under congressional mandate to 
take jurisdiction over every case that properly came before it, to consider the briefs, to 
hear the oral argument, and to resolve the merits of each case by written opinions or 
otherwise.”). 
111. See David M. O’Brien, Storm Center: The Supreme Court in American Politics 
160 (Aaron Javsicas ed., 9th ed. 2011) (providing chart showing Court’s docket from 1800 
until 1850 generally included 250 cases or fewer). 
112. Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 96, at 60 (noting that, from 1850 to 1890, 
Court’s docket grew from 253 to 1,816 cases). 
113. See H.R. Rep. No. 51-1295, at 3 (1890) (referring to Justice Harlan’s statement 
that, in 1886, Court disposed of only 451 out of 1,396 cases on docket). 
114. Specifically, Chief Justice Waite explained: 
As to the Supreme Court, the Constitution provides that in all cases affecting 
embassadors [sic], other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a State 
shall be a party, it shall have original jurisdiction, and in all others within the 
judicial power appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such 
exceptions and under such regulations as Congress shall make. The original 
jurisdiction is thus fixed by the Constitution, and it cannot be taken away by 
Congress, but the appellate jurisdiction is subject entirely to congressional 
control. . . . If at any time too large . . . , it may be reduced, and a part trans-
ferred to an inferior court . . . .  
Remarks of Chief Justice Waite, 36 Albany L.J. 318, 318 (1887). 
115. Id. 
116. Id. 
117. Annual Report of the Attorney General for the Year 1889, at xviii–xix (1889) 
(emphasizing “[t]he importance of some change in the judicial system of the United 
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the Union address, arguing that “[t]he necessity of providing some more 
speedy method for disposing of the cases . . . [in] the Supreme Court 
becomes every year more apparent and urgent.”118 
Several Republican legislators, including Senator William Evarts, 
proposed bills to respond to the Court’s concerns. Senator Evarts argued 
that Congress had an “obligation[] under the Constitution” to provide 
relief to the Court, while “leav[ing] entirely uncurtailed” the Court’s au-
thority over constitutional questions and “other questions of a public 
nature.”119 Under the Evarts plan, the Supreme Court would retain 
mandatory appellate jurisdiction over virtually all cases arising under 
federal law.120 But the Court would have the discretion to review other 
classes of cases, including diversity suits.121 A new system of appellate 
courts would have primary responsibility for deciding those nonfederal 
cases, subject to review in the Supreme Court in one of two ways—either 
by certification from the court of appeals or by way of a writ of 
certiorari.122 Senator Evarts stated that such Supreme Court oversight was 
necessary to “guard against diversity of judgment in these [new 
appellate] courts” and to preserve the “uniformity of decision” within the 
federal judiciary.123 
                                                                                                                 
States, which will enable the courts, and especially the Supreme Court, to dispose of the 
large number of cases”); see also, e.g., Annual Report of the Attorney General for the Year 
1885, at 36–43 (1885) (advocating intermediate court of appeals in part on ground that 
“[i]t will undoubtedly very largely reduce the docket of the Supreme Court”). Notably, 
President Cleveland’s Attorney General, Augustus Garland, supported the Court’s request 
for relief, even as he also advocated the proposal to restrict federal jurisdiction over 
corporate suits. See id. at 42 (“[C]orporations doing business in States other than those 
from which they derive their . . . powers should . . . be placed strictly on the footing of 
domestic corporations [and] . . . should not be permitted to invoke Federal 
jurisdiction . . . . So, too, [should] corporations created by acts of Congress . . . .”). 
118. First Annual Message of President Benjamin Harrison (Dec. 3, 1889), in 2 The 
State of the Union Messages of the Presidents, 1790–1966, at 1638 (Fred L. Israel ed., 
1966) [hereinafter State of the Union Messages]. Both President Harrison and the 
Attorneys General supported the proposal for an intermediate court of appeals. See infra 
notes 119–122 and accompanying text (describing how appellate courts would function). 
119. 21 Cong. Rec. 10,220 (1890) (statement of Sen. William Evarts, R-N.Y.) (“[T]he 
great point . . . is to provide intermediate courts that shall answer the purpose of our 
obligations under the Constitution, that shall leave entirely uncurtailed the authority of 
the Supreme Court in . . . the supervision of laws in the sense of constitutionality and 
other questions of a public nature . . . .”). 
120. See S. Rep. No. 51-1571, at 1–2 (1890) (detailing Court’s broad jurisdiction over 
federal cases under Evarts plan). 
121. See id. at 2 (proposing to give circuit courts final jurisdiction in diversity, patent, 
revenue, criminal, and admiralty cases).  
122. Id. 
123. 21 Cong. Rec. 10,222 (1890) (statement of Sen. William Maxwell Evarts, R-N.Y.) 
(stating provisions for certification and certiorari review would “guard against diversity of 
judgment in these [new appellate] courts” and ensure Supreme Court “review[] in the 
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The political dynamics surrounding this proposal in many respects 
mirrored those of the Culberson bill. Republican legislators strongly 
supported the reform, which would empower the probusiness judiciary 
by giving it sufficient personnel and resources to handle the additional 
duties created by the 1875 Act.124 But many Democratic lawmakers 
strongly opposed the plan. They refused to support any bill that would 
enlarge the size of the federal judiciary, particularly given that the addi-
tional judges would be selected by a Republican.125 President Harrison 
had two more years remaining in his term, and he already had a track 
record of appointing staunchly probusiness individuals to the federal 
bench.126 The Democrats argued instead that, if the Supreme Court was 
overworked, the solution was to reduce the scope of federal juris-
diction.127 Indeed, some Democrats pointed out that the Culberson bill, 
if enacted, would resolve many of the Court’s workload problems.128  
Accordingly, Congress could have remained “deadlocked” on judi-
cial reform.129 The Democrats would continue to support efforts to 
restrict federal jurisdiction, while the Republicans would oppose them. 
The Republicans would favor the creation of a new appellate court 
system to relieve the Supreme Court, while the Democrats would block 
                                                                                                                 
interest of jurisprudence and uniformity of decision,” and system would “leave[] flexibility, 
elasticity, and openness for supervision by the Supreme Court”).  
124. See, e.g., 21 Cong. Rec. 10,227 (1890) (statement of Sen. Joseph Dolph, R-Or.) 
(arguing “the plain imperative duty of Congress . . . [i]s to provide adequate judicial 
machinery for the prompt transaction of the business of the federal courts”). 
125. See id. at 10,678 (statement of Rep. William Breckinridge, D-Ky.) (opposing new 
judgeships); id. at 10,306 (statement of Sen. George Vest, D-Mo.) (“It has been 
suggested . . . that I want no more Federal judges because there is a Republican 
Administration in power which might . . . appoint them. I have thought of that, and I 
would rather have in any office men who agree with me politically. I am a Democrat.”). 
126. See Henry J. Abraham, Justices, Presidents, and Senators: A History of the U.S. 
Supreme Court Appointments from Washington to Clinton 111 (1999) (noting Harrison 
Justices adhered to “freedom of contract, absence of governmental restraint on business 
activities, and the sanctity of property”). 
127. See 22 Cong. Rec. 3586 (1891) (statement of Rep. William Breckinridge, D-Ky.) 
(stating “the first and main remedy [to the workload crisis] . . . is to take from the Federal 
judiciary the vast amount of jurisdiction which does not under our system properly belong 
to it”); 21 Cong. Rec. 3406 (1890) (statement of Rep. William Oates, D-Ala.) (contending 
Congress could relieve Supreme Court by repealing federal courts’ entire diversity 
jurisdiction). 
128. See 10 Cong. Rec. 951 (1880) (statement of Rep. James Knott, D-Ky.) 
(supporting Culberson bill, in part because it would reduce Supreme Court’s docket by 
“fully one-third, if not one-half”); id. at 993 (statement of Rep. Frank Hurd, D-Ohio) 
(supporting bill for similar reasons: “The Supreme Court . . . is complaining [that] it 
cannot dispose of the causes upon . . . [its] docket [and because] [t]he judges are now 
more than three years behind”). 
129. Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 96, at 89, 93 (observing, in 1870s and 1880s, 
“[t]he two houses were deadlocked” and recounting “[a]fter the [bill to restructure the 
judiciary] passed the Senate, it was buried in the House Judiciary Committee”). 
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that reform. Such a deadlock should have been particularly likely, given 
that the Supreme Court was as dominated by probusiness jurists as the 
rest of the federal judiciary.130 And, indeed, for several years, these 
partisan divisions did delay efforts to provide relief to the Court.131 
However, ultimately, Senator Evarts’s proposal attracted some 
notable bipartisan support. A group of key Democrats in both the House 
and the Senate supported the creation of the new appellate court 
system—principally because the measure appeared to be the only means 
of addressing the Supreme Court’s caseload crisis.132 For example, 
Senator John Reagan stated that the need to “secur[e] relief” for the 
Court “reconciles me to consent to the appointment of this additional 
number of judges, which I suppose we are to have appointed in a 
partisan way.”133 
But the most remarkable support came from Representative 
Culberson. This champion of jurisdiction-stripping legislation was also 
one of the leading proponents of the Evarts plan. Representative 
Culberson argued that there was an “absolute necessity . . . to relieve the 
Supreme Court of the burden of business imposed upon it by existing 
laws.”134 He also insisted that “[t]he remedy” for the Court’s caseload 
crisis was “within the easy reach of Congress” under the Exceptions 
Clause: 
The authority vested in Congress to make exceptions to and 
regulate the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court was 
granted for the purpose of enabling the Congress to adapt the 
                                                                                                                 
130. See supra notes 91–93 and accompanying text (noting Republicans advanced 
party’s economic goals by appointing economic conservatives to federal judiciary). 
131. See Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 96, at 89, 93 (noting “[t]he [often 
Democratic] House was for curtailment of power,” but Senate “resisted” and “sought to 
provide [federal courts] with more efficient machinery and more judges to dispose of 
their increased business”). 
132. See, e.g., 21 Cong. Rec. 3408 (1890) (statement of Rep. John Rogers, D-Ariz.) 
(stating although he “heartily sympathize[d]” with those who favored jurisdictional 
restrictions and supported Culberson’s bill, such legislation had “not yet passed the 
Senate” and Congress could not “reasonably hope” to lessen Court’s workload “by a 
repetition of that action which we have found of no avail”); id. at 10,285 (statement of 
Sen. John Reagan, D-Tex.) (supporting bill in part because it would help to “unload the 
Supreme Court”). 
133. Id. at 10,285 (statement of Senator John Reagan, D-Tex.). 
134. Id. at 3403 (statement of Rep. David Culberson, D-Tex.) (supporting House bill 
to create new appellate court system for this reason); see also 22 Cong. Rec. 3585 (1891) 
(statement of Rep. David Culberson, D-Tex.) (supporting Evarts plan “for the reasons 
which induced me to support the House bill . . . . The same objects and results . . . are 
secured by the Senate amendment”). Representative Culberson also favored the reform 
because it would enhance the Supreme Court’s power to oversee the inferior federal 
courts, and thereby end the “judicial despotism” exercised by some lower court judges. 21 
Cong. Rec. 3403 (statement of Rep. David Culberson, D-Tex.); see also infra notes 142–
146 and accompanying text (noting jurisdictional expansions in new law).  
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appellate jurisdiction of the court to the varying demands of the 
business, trade, and commerce of the country and to protect 
and shield that great tribunal from the conditions which exist 
to-day. . . . [T]his bill will, in my opinion, reasonably protect the 
court from an excessive burden of litigation and conform its 
appellate jurisdiction to the enormous growth of the business of 
the country.135 
Representative Culberson further observed that the Supreme Court 
could still review the cases “excepted” from its mandatory appellate juris-
diction.136 He argued that it was crucial for the Court to retain such 
“supervisory control over all questions . . . within the judicial power of 
the United States.”137 This “supervisory control” would enable the Court 
to enforce the “uniformity of decision . . . throughout the entire judicial 
system of the United States.”138 
The Evarts bill ultimately passed both the House and the Senate with 
this (modest) bipartisan support.139 The Judiciary Act of 1891 largely 
                                                                                                                 
135. 21 Cong. Rec. 3403–04 (statement of Rep. David Culberson, D-Tex.).  
136. Representative Culberson was referring to the original House bill, which 
provided that cases outside the Supreme Court’s mandatory jurisdiction would reach the 
Court upon certification by the courts of appeals. The House bill required certification 
whenever there was a conflict among the courts of appeals. See H.R. Rep. No. 51-1295, at 2 
(1890) (“[A]ny question which has been decided differently in another circuit court shall 
be certified to the Supreme Court for determination.”). The House bill did not provide 
for writs of certiorari. See id. at 1–2. But as Edward Hartnett has observed, legislators at 
the time viewed certification and writs of certiorari as largely indistinguishable. See 
Hartnett, supra note 73, at 1656 (noting Senator Evarts and others “viewed certification 
and certiorari as ‘parallel provisions’” and envisioned “certiorari . . . as a sort of fallback 
provision should the circuit courts of appeals prove, on occasion, to be surprisingly 
careless in deciding cases or issuing certificates”). Indeed, Representative Culberson 
supported the Senate bill, because he believed it accomplished the same objectives as the 
House bill. See supra note 134 (discussing Culberson’s support of Senate bill). 
137. 21 Cong. Rec. 3405 (1890) (statement of Rep. David Culberson, D-Tex.). 
138. Id.; see also id. at 10,221 (statement of Sen. William Evarts, R-N.Y.) (noting one 
crucial question was how to reduce “the burden of the docket of the Supreme Court” 
while “maintain[ing] . . . [the] just uniformity of decision”). 
139. The Evarts bill passed the Senate by a vote of 44-6. Id. at 10,364–65. Sixteen of 
the Senators voting in favor of the measure were Democrats. Id. at 10,364. Given that the 
Senate at the time included thirty-nine Republicans and thirty-seven Democrats, see 
Historical Statistics, supra note 94, at 5-201 tbl.Eb296-308, some Democratic support was 
likely necessary for passage of the bill. Indeed, at that time, a single senator could have 
filibustered the measure. See Filibuster and Cloture, United States Senate, http://www
.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Filibuster_Cloture.htm (on file with 
the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Apr. 23, 2013) (discussing history of filibuster and 
noting Senate did not adopt cloture rule until 1917). The bipartisan support was more 
modest in the House. The House passed a version of the reform on April 15, 1890, by a 
vote of 131-13. 21 Cong. Rec. 3410. Only a handful of Democrats (eight) voted in favor of 
the final bill. But, notably, only thirteen Democrats voted against the measure; 132 
Democrats simply declined to vote. Id. The House accepted the Evarts bill, as it passed the 
Senate, by a vote of 107-62. 22 Cong. Rec. 3587 (1891). The individual votes in the House 
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codified the Evarts plan. Under the Act, the Supreme Court had manda-
tory appellate jurisdiction over federal question cases from the lower 
federal courts140 and only discretionary review power (through certiorari 
or certification) over other classes of cases.141  
Notably, the Act did not reduce the Court’s jurisdiction in every 
respect. The statute expanded the Supreme Court’s appellate review 
power over federal question cases by reducing the amount-in-controversy 
requirement from $5,000 to $1,000.142 The Act also significantly ex-
panded the Court’s jurisdiction in criminal cases, providing for review in 
any case involving “a capital or otherwise infamous crime.”143 Although 
some legislators worried that these provisions would undermine the pro-
posed relief for the Court,144 others argued that any additional burden 
was justified by the importance of providing for Supreme Court review of 
important federal questions.145 Representative Culberson, for example, 
strongly supported these expansions, arguing that “[a]s the Supreme 
Court is the Federal head of the judicial department of the 
Government,” the Court should review all “questions of a Federal 
character.”146 
                                                                                                                 
on that final measure were not recorded. Id. President Benjamin Harrison signed the 
measure into law on March 2, 1891. See id. at 3760. 
140. See Circuit Court of Appeals Act §§ 5–6, 26 Stat. 826, 827–28 (1891) (providing 
for mandatory review in federal cases when amount in controversy exceeded $1,000). 
141. See id. §§ 1, 2, 6, 26 Stat. at 826, 828 (authorizing discretionary review over cases 
from new appellate courts involving diversity, revenue laws, patent laws, federal criminal 
laws, and admiralty). 
142. See id. § 6, 26 Stat. at 828 (authorizing right of appeal in diversity cases “where 
the matter in controversy shall exceed one thousand dollars”). 
143. Id. § 5, 26 Stat. at 827–28. Two years earlier, Congress had given the Supreme 
Court mandatory appellate jurisdiction over capital cases. Act of Feb. 6, 1889, ch. 113, § 6, 
25 Stat. 655, 656. Prior to these statutes, the Supreme Court could review criminal cases 
only if two circuit judges certified the matter to the Court, see Frankfurter & Landis, supra 
note 96, at 109, or (in some cases) via a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, see Pfander, 
Jurisdiction-Stripping, supra note 26, at 1488–90. 
144. Indeed, these modifications led Representative John Rogers, one of the leading 
proponents of the reform in the House, to withdraw his support for the bill. See 22 Cong. 
Rec. 3585 (1891) (statement of Rep. John Rogers, D-Ark.) (arguing additional jurisdiction 
over criminal appeals would “intensif[y]” Court’s caseload difficulties). Senator Evarts also 
initially opposed the expansion of the Court’s appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases. See 
21 Cong. Rec. 10,302–03 (1890) (statement of Sen. William Evarts, R-N.Y.) (worrying 
criminal appeals “would be a great burden” on Court). But he ultimately compromised on 
this point. See id. at 10,308–09 (statement of Sen. William Evarts, R-N.Y.) (agreeing to 
restrict amendment to cover “capital or otherwise infamous” crimes).  
145. See 22 Cong. Rec. 3584, 3587 (statement of Rep. Nathan Frank, R-Mo.) 
(asserting any burden on Court would be “counterbalanced by the . . . justice of getting it 
this [criminal] jurisdiction on appeal”); id. at 3586 (statement of Rep. David Culberson, D-
Tex.) (“If there is any class of judgments which deserve a higher and greater consideration 
than another it seems to me that a judgment which takes life or liberty falls within it.”). 
146. 21 Cong. Rec. 3405 (statement of Rep. David Culberson, D-Tex.). 
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The debates over the 1891 legislation suggest that, by the late nine-
teenth century, a number of legislators had begun to see value in the 
Supreme Court’s settlement function.147 Although progressives like 
Representative Culberson could not expect the probusiness Court to 
issue rulings that they favored, they could nevertheless benefit from the 
Court’s role in “enforcing” the “uniformity of decision . . . throughout 
the entire judicial system of the United States.”148 This bipartisan political 
support was not, of course, universal. Many Democrats opposed the 1891 
reform. But there was enough support to ensure enactment of the Evarts 
plan (even as court-curbing legislation was blocked by the political 
process). Thus, Congress was able to use its “authority . . . to make excep-
tions to and regulate the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court” to 
“shield that great tribunal . . . from an excessive burden of litigation and 
conform its appellate jurisdiction to the enormous growth of the business 
of the country.”149 
III. EXPANSIONS AND EXCEPTIONS IN THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY 
Congress again acted to facilitate the Supreme Court’s settlement 
function in the early twentieth century. As in the 1890s, this era was a 
period of intense political conflict over the judiciary—now focused on 
the Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence.150 Progressives 
increasingly attacked the Court’s use of the Due Process and Commerce 
Clauses to limit state and federal efforts to regulate wages and workplace 
conditions. Meanwhile, the economic conservatives in the Republican 
Party continued to defend the Court’s efforts to protect the free market. 
But, even in this charged political environment, these political factions 
came together to enact—by far wider margins than in 1891—legislation 
that protected the Supreme Court’s role in the constitutional scheme. 
 
                                                                                                                 
147. See, e.g., 21 Cong. Rec. 10,221–22 (statement of Sen. William Evarts, R-N.Y.) 
(emphasizing need for Supreme Court review to “guard against diversity of judgment in 
these [new appellate] courts” and ensure “uniformity of decision”). 
148. Id. at 3405 (statement of Rep. David Culberson, D-Tex.); see also id. at 3408 
(statement of Rep. John Rogers, D-Ariz.) (arguing “if the bill has one feature that 
commends it to the country it is that it retains that great central power, the Supreme 
Court . . . , with ample authority to extend its arms and to bring each one of these nine 
circuits into harmonious adjudication upon the same question” and thereby ensure 
uniformity of decision). 
149. Id. at 3404 (statement of Rep. David Culberson, D-Tex.). 
150. See William G. Ross, A Muted Fury: Populists, Progressives, and Labor Unions 
Confront the Courts, 1890–1937, at 179 (1994) (observing, from 1890 to 1937, “populists, 
progressives, and labor leaders subjected both state and federal courts to vigorous and 
persistent criticism,” and “[p]rogressive proposals [during the 1920s] more often involved 
only the Supreme Court”). 
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A. Progressive Attacks on the Supreme Court: 1920s 
In the early twentieth century, the progressive movement gained 
strength in both political parties.151 There were not only progressive 
Democrats but also a growing number of progressive Republicans who 
were deeply critical of the Supreme Court’s constitutional juris-
prudence.152 The Republican Party was thus divided between the (once 
dominant) economic conservatives and this new progressive wing.153 
Moreover, progressive Republicans appeared to be gaining political 
strength after the 1922 elections, when they won several important 
congressional seats.154 Although the progressives “still held only a small 
number of seats in Congress, their strength exceeded their numbers.”155 
The progressive Republicans “held the balance of power in Congress,” 
because the economic conservatives had to rely on their support in order 
to enact legislation.156 
During this same period, the Supreme Court was increasingly hostile 
to social and economic legislation.157 Progressives were particularly out-
raged by the Court’s 1918 decision in Hammer v. Dagenhart, which invali-
dated a federal child labor law.158 In the wake of this and similar 
rulings,159 progressives launched a series of attacks on the Supreme 
Court. 
                                                                                                                 
151. See Chambers, supra note 88, at 14 (noting, during fourth party system, which 
lasted from 1896 to 1932, progressive reformers gained political strength by “weaken[ing] 
party structure and the hold of parties on voters” through democratic reforms). 
152. See Whittington, Political Foundations, supra note 42, at 261 (noting 
“[p]rogressive factions challenged Republican Party leadership in both the House and the 
Senate, fracturing apparent legislative majorities”). 
153. See id. (observing “conservatives faced new challenges in the first decades of the 
twentieth century from progressive reformers within the Republican Party,” who managed 
to “fractur[e] apparent legislative majorities”).  




157. See, e.g., Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 545–62 (1923) (invalidating 
minimum wage law for women and children on due process grounds as violation of liberty 
of contract), overruled in part by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); 
Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20, 36–39, 44 (1922) (striking down, on Tenth 
Amendment grounds, federal law that sought to ban child labor by taxing products of 
child labor); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 272–73 (1918) (invalidating federal 
statute prohitibing child labor on ground that “labor” was not “commerce”), overruled in 
part by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
158. Hammer, 247 U.S. at 272–73; see also Ross, supra note 150, at 169 (observing 
Hammer v. Dagenhart “provided an impetus for specific proposals to curb the Court’s 
power”). 
159. See supra note 157 (describing Court’s antagonism toward progressives’ 
legislative initiatives).  
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Some legislators proposed constitutional amendments to undo the 
Court’s rulings. For example, Senator Robert La Follette suggested a 
constitutional amendment permitting Congress to reenact any law that 
had been struck down by the Supreme Court.160 But other progressives 
sought to correct the Court’s constitutional decisions by statute. These 
statutory proposals relied on Congress’s power to make “exceptions” to 
and “regulate” the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction. 
Several legislators sought to impose supermajority requirements on 
the Court’s exercise of judicial review.161 For example, Senator William 
Borah introduced a bill that would require the concurrence of seven 
Justices to invalidate any act of Congress.162 He argued that “[w]hen a 
measure has passed the Congress and received the approval of the 
President it seems unreasonable that such a measure should be rejected 
by a decision in which no more than five out of nine judges concur.”163  
Other legislators advocated restrictions on the Supreme Court’s 
appellate jurisdiction. Senator Robert Owen proposed legislation that 
would reenact the child labor law and prohibit the Court from ruling on 
the constitutionality of the new statute.164 Senator Owen believed that 
Congress had ample power to make “such exceptions and such regula-
tions . . . as to prevent the Supreme Court from nullifying acts of 
Congress, or assuming to declare questions of great national policy”165: 
The Supreme Court of the United States has no jurisdiction 
worth mentioning, except appellate jurisdiction. That appellate 
jurisdiction under Article III . . . is subject to the control of 
Congress, and is granted “with such exceptions, and under such 
regulations as the Congress shall make.” Therefore Congress 
can take from that court . . . such part of that jurisdiction as it 
may see fit.166 
                                                                                                                 
160. See 62 Cong. Rec. 9073–74, 9081 (1922) (statement of Sen. Robert La Follette, 
R-Wis.) (“What I propose is that Congress shall be enabled to override this usurped 
judicial veto . . . just as it has the power to override the presidential veto . . . .”). 
161. See Ross, supra note 150, at 222, 231–32 (discussing release of several plans to 
curb Court’s jurisdiction). 
162. See 64 Cong. Rec. 3004 (1923) (statement of Sen. William Borah, R-Idaho) 
(noting introduction of bill by Senator Borah “providing the number of judges which [sic] 
shall concur in holding an act of Congress unconstitutional”). 
163. Id. at 3959 (reproducing article by Sen. William Borah, R-Idaho); see also id. at 
3960 (asserting Congress may “provide under the scope of ‘regulations’ touching the 
appellate jurisdiction that before an act of Congress shall be declared void at least seven 
judges shall concur”). 
164. See 56 Cong. Rec. 7431–32 (1918) (statement of Sen. Robert Owen, D-Okla.) 
(proposing two amendments to child labor bill). Senator Owen’s proposal stated in part, 
“No judge of an inferior Federal court shall permit the question of the constitutionality of 
this act to be raised in the court over which he presides, and the United States Supreme 
Court shall have no appellate power to pass upon such question.” Id. at 7432. 
165. 64 Cong. Rec. 3958 (statement of Sen. Robert Owen, D-Okla.). 
166. 55 Cong. Rec. 847 (1917) (statement of Sen. Robert Owen, D-Okla.). 
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In response, conservatives defended the Supreme Court, empha-
sizing the Court’s role in the preservation of liberty and the protection of 
minorities.167 For example, Senator Walter Edge decried the “attack[s] 
upon the highest court in our land, the bulwark of liberty and 
freedom.”168 Likewise, Senator Frank Kellogg asserted that “the highest 
court of the land was established to see that the citizen was protected in 
his constitutional rights against [legislative and executive] encroach-
ments.”169 He insisted that “[t]he guaranties of th[e] Constitution could 
not possibly be enforced without” the Supreme Court.170 
Ultimately, none of the proposals to limit the authority of the 
Supreme Court gained traction in Congress. Although the economic 
conservatives needed progressive support to enact legislation, they had 
ample power to block the progressives’ court-curbing efforts.171 Indeed, 
the statutory proposals by Senators Borah and Owen never even made it 
out of committee in either chamber of Congress.172 
B. Expanding Certiorari Review: 1925 
During the early twentieth century, the Supreme Court’s caseload 
continued to increase dramatically.173 The mounting volume of cases was 
caused in large part by Congress’s expansion of the Court’s appellate 
jurisdiction.174 For example, the 1891 statute not only created certiorari 
review but also greatly expanded the Court’s appellate jurisdiction in 
                                                                                                                 
167. As William Ross has noted, these arguments were somewhat counterfactual 
because the Court at that time had not proven to be a great defender of individual liberty. 
See Ross, supra note 150, at 204–05 (observing, at least until Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 
390 (1923), which protected parental rights, “the Court’s history . . . afforded scant 
support for [this] contention”). Notably, some progressives also opposed the attacks on 
the Supreme Court. See, e.g., 65 Cong. Rec. 247 (1923) (reproducing article by Sen. John 
K. Shields, D-Tenn.) (arguing that La Follette, Borah, and Owen proposals, “if successful, 
would result in the absorption by the legislative department of all judicial power, a 
condition subversive of all liberty”); see also Ross, supra note 150, at 197 (noting 
progressives were “divided on the issue of judicial reform”). 
168. 62 Cong. Rec. 9073 (1922) (statement of Sen. Walter Edge, R-N.J.). 
169. 56 Cong. Rec. 7434 (statement of Sen. Frank Billings Kellogg, R-Minn.). 
170. Id. He further argued, “We might as well wipe out the Constitution as abolish 
the Supreme Court of the United States, which has for more than 100 years been the rock 
of the liberties of the American people.” Id. 
171. See Ross, supra note 150, at 196, 232 (noting measures to curb Court’s power 
failed due to conservatives’ firm control of Congress). 
172. See id. (observing proposals failed in large part because “conservatives 
controlled the judiciary committees in both houses”). Senator La Follette’s suggested 
constitutional amendment was “never even embodied in a bill.” Id. at 320. 
173. See Lee Epstein et al., The Supreme Court Compendium: Data, Decisions and 
Developments 63 tbl.2-2 (4th ed. 2007) (showing rise in Court’s caseload from 1,116 in 
1910 to 1,316 in 1924). 
174. See Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 96, at 65, 203 (noting 1875 and 1914 
expansions in particular contributed to rise in Court’s workload). 
2013] EXCEPTIONS CLAUSE 963 
  
criminal and federal question cases. In 1914, Congress also voted—with-
out recorded dissent—to extend the Court’s jurisdiction over state court 
rulings to encompass all federal question cases, including cases in which 
the state court upheld a federal right.175 Prior to the 1914 Act, the Court 
could review only cases in which the state court rejected a federal 
claim.176  
Notably, these jurisdictional expansions were designed to enhance 
the Court’s power to resolve federal questions. As noted, supporters of 
the expansions in the 1891 Act sought to allow the Court to review all 
“questions of a Federal character” from the lower federal courts.177 Like-
wise, proponents of the 1914 Act argued that it would enable the Court 
to preserve “the uniformity of the Federal laws in their practical applica-
tion to . . . the several States.”178 
Congress, however, also recognized that these jurisdictional expan-
sions might burden the Court and thereby undermine its capacity to 
settle disputed federal questions. Indeed, for that reason, the 1914 Act 
granted the Court discretionary certiorari review when a state court up-
held a federal right.179 As the Act’s sponsor Senator Elihu Root ex-
plained, certiorari jurisdiction would enable the Court to “secur[e] uni-
formity in the law,” without “open[ing] the gates to a flood of appeals.”180 
Over the next few years, Congress also authorized certiorari review in 
other areas, including bankruptcy cases.181 But this piecemeal reduction 
in the Court’s mandatory appellate jurisdiction did little to ameliorate 
the Court’s growing caseload crisis. 
                                                                                                                 
175. Act of Dec. 23, 1914, ch. 2, 38 Stat. 790, 790. 
176. See supra notes 79–82 and accompanying text (examining limitations on 
Court’s jurisdiction between 1789 and Civil War). 
177. 21 Cong. Rec. 3405 (1890) (statement of Rep. David Culberson, D-Tex.); see 
also supra notes 140–141 and accompanying text (describing Court’s appellate jurisdiction 
over federal question cases). 
178. H.R. Rep. No. 63-1222, at 2 (1914); see also 48 Cong. Rec. 6012 (1912) 
(statement of Sen. Elihu Root, R-N.Y.) (“The sole object of the [1914 legislation] . . . is to 
make it possible for the Supreme Court to pass upon Federal questions so as to have 
uniformity of law.”).  
179. Act of Dec. 23, 1914, ch. 2, 38 Stat. at 790. 
180. 48 Cong. Rec. 6012 (statement of Sen. Elihu Root, R-N.Y.). 
181. See Act of Sept. 6, 1916, ch. 448, § 2, 39 Stat. 726, 726–27 (granting certiorari 
review over certain state court cases denying federal right, including those involving 
Federal Employers’ Liability Act); Act of Jan. 28, 1915, ch. 22, 38 Stat. 803 (granting 
certiorari review over circuit court judgments in bankruptcy and trademark cases). 
Notably, these statutes reflected Congress’s growing view that the Supreme Court should 
focus its limited resources on resolving important issues of federal law. See S. Rep. No. 64-
775, at 2 (1916) (stating certiorari review would enable Court to focus on state court 
appeals involving questions of “general importance”); H.R. Rep. No. 63-1182, at 2 (1914) 
(granting certiorari review on ground that “[t]he bankruptcy law has now been so 
thoroughly construed that . . . cases now coming to the Supreme Court . . . involve 
complicated questions of fact rather than of law”). 
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As a result, Chief Justice William Howard Taft—much like Chief 
Justice Waite before him—urged Congress to dramatically reduce the 
Court’s mandatory appellate jurisdiction.182 The Chief Justice insisted 
that such a reform was necessary to preserve the Court’s settlement 
function. Taft argued that “[t]he business of the court is rapidly 
increasing,” and absent a reduction in the Court’s mandatory juris-
diction, it would be “impossible for the court to dispatch promptly, as it 
should, the important questions which it is organized to settle.”183 
Chief Justice Taft and other Justices argued that the Court should 
concentrate its limited resources on its two primary functions: resolving 
important issues of federal law and settling conflicts among the lower 
courts.184 For example, Justice McReynolds stated that a case “should 
come to [the Supreme Court] for final disposition” only if it “involves [a] 
matter of general importance, some statute to be construed, some consti-
tutional provision,” or if the “circuit courts of appeals entertain differing 
views.”185 He declared that the “real function of our court is this: to settle 
the law, so the lawyers may know how to advise their clients and so that 
trial judges may know how . . . to decide cases that come before them.”186 
As in 1891, the executive branch strongly supported the Supreme 
Court’s request for a reform to help it resolve important federal 
questions. In testimony before Congress, President Warren Harding’s 
Solicitor General, James Beck, stated that although “it would be 
                                                                                                                 
182. See Hartnett, supra note 73, at 1660–704 (describing Chief Justice Taft’s 
efforts).  
183. Jurisdiction of Circuit Courts of Appeals and United States Supreme Court: 
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 1 (1922) [hereinafter 
Jurisdiction of Circuit Courts Hearing] (statement of William Howard Taft, C.J., U.S. 
Supreme Court). 
184. See, e.g., Letter from C.J. William Howard Taft to Sen. Royal S. Copeland (Dec. 
9, 1924), in 66 Cong. Rec. 2920 (1925) (asserting “the business of the Supreme Court 
should be to consider and decide for the benefit of the public and for the benefit of 
uniformity of decision only questions of importance”); Jurisdiction of Circuit Courts of 
Appeals and of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 17 (1924) [hereinafter Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court 
Hearing] (statement of Willis Van Devanter, J., U.S. Supreme Court) (stating Court would 
grant review only if case “involves questions of general importance or that a decision by 
the Supreme Court is necessary to produce needed uniformity”). Indeed, Justice Van 
Devanter declared that the Court always granted a certiorari petition in the event of a 
conflict among the lower courts. See Procedure in Federal Courts: Hearing on S. 2060 and 
S. 2061 Before the Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 29–30 (1924) 
[hereinafter Procedure in Federal Courts Hearing] (statement of Willis Van Devanter, J., 
U.S. Supreme Court) (“Whenever we find . . . a conflict [among the state supreme courts 
or circuit courts of appeals] that, without more, leads to the granting of the 
petition . . . .”). 
185. Procedure in Federal Courts Hearing, supra note 184, at 45 (statement of James 
C. McReynolds, J., U.S. Supreme Court). 
186. Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court Hearing, supra note 184, at 22 (statement of 
James C. McReynolds, J., U.S. Supreme Court). 
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admirable if in every case an appeal could be taken as a matter of right,” 
such a requirement was impractical.187 The Court should therefore have 
the discretion to focus on cases “involving very great and substantial 
questions.”188 Likewise, in his 1924 State of the Union address, President 
Calvin Coolidge asserted that the Court should have the power to 
“reserve its time for . . . extended consideration” of cases “of public 
moment.”189  
Economic conservatives in Congress also supported the certiorari 
expansion.190 The conservatives had good reason to facilitate the author-
ity of this probusiness Court to settle important federal questions.191 By 
contrast, progressives had good reason to oppose the certiorari bill. Many 
believed that the Court had “to a large extent usurped the lawmaking 
power” by invalidating federal and state economic legislation.192 More-
over, progressive Republicans “held the balance of power” in Congress.193 
Accordingly, even if the progressives could not enact court-curbing 
measures, they could at a minimum prevent legislation that would 
enhance the Supreme Court’s power. 
But the progressives did not block the certiorari bill. Even out-
spoken critics of the judiciary, such as Senator La Follette, failed to 
object to the proposal.194 Furthermore, although many progressives 
simply remained silent on the measure, one of its chief proponents was 
progressive Republican Senator Albert Cummins.195 
                                                                                                                 
187. Jurisdiction of Circuit Courts Hearing, supra note 183, at 18 (statement of James 
M. Beck, Solicitor Gen. of the United States) (arguing if litigants had this right, “the 
calendar of the court would become so congested and clogged the wheels of justice would 
stick in the mud”).  
188. Id. at 19. 
189. Second Annual Message of President Calvin Coolidge (Dec. 3, 1924), in 3 State 
of the Union Messages, supra note 118, at 2662. 
190. During this era, the conservatives retained control over the judiciary committees 
in both the House and Senate. Ross, supra note 150, at 196. Both houses strongly 
endorsed the proposed certiorari expansion. See H.R. Rep. No. 68-1075, at 1 (1925) 
(recommending passage of legislation); S. Rep. No. 68-362, at 1 (1924) (same). 
191. See Friedman & Delaney, supra note 41, at 1162–66 (“Corporate interests 
recognized that to obtain substantive results in judicial doctrine, they needed to empower 
the Court by expanding its jurisdiction and affirming its position at the apex of a 
restructured federal judiciary branch.”). 
192. 62 Cong. Rec. 9076 (1922) (statement of Sen. Robert La Follette, R-Wis.); see 
also supra notes 157–159 and accompanying text (describing progressives’ anger arising 
from Court’s hostility toward social and economic legislation). 
193. Ross, supra note 150, at 211. 
194. See id. at 252–53 (noting lack of opposition); see also Hartnett, supra note 73, at 
1645 (observing “Senator Thomas Walsh, a progressive Democrat from Montana . . . , 
attempted a lonely fight against the bill” (footnote omitted)). 
195. See Ross, supra note 150, at 93 (noting Senator Cummins was progressive); 
Hartnett, supra note 73, at 1662 (noting lack of “serious discussion or debate” over 
measure in House and Senate). 
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Senator Cummins and other supporters argued—much like the 
Justices themselves—that the Supreme Court’s primary functions were to 
resolve important issues of federal law and to settle conflicts among the 
lower courts.196 But the Court’s mandatory appellate jurisdiction had 
impaired the Court’s capacity to perform this settlement function: 
“Having to hear numbers of cases of trivial character . . . , the [Supreme 
Court] is hindered from hearing and determining more important cases 
and from efficiently . . . perform[ing] . . . its highest duty of interpreting 
the Constitution and preserving uniformity of decision” on federal 
questions.197 Thus, Senator Cummins and others argued that Congress 
should “restrict or reduce the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court . . . in order to enable it fairly to meet the demands that are made 
upon it.”198  
There was very little vocal opposition to the certiorari expansion in 
Congress.199 But, notably, even critics agreed on the need to preserve the 
Supreme Court’s role in resolving federal questions.200 For example, 
Senator Thomas Walsh—the most outspoken opponent of the 
measure201—argued that “the primary function of [the Supreme Court] 
is to give an authoritative interpretation of Federal law, constitutional 
and statutory.”202 He simply worried that the Court would not be able to 
perform this crucial function if it did not hear every federal question 
case.203 Thus, Senator Walsh preferred to grant relief by limiting review 
                                                                                                                 
196. See H.R. Rep. No. 68-1075, at 2 (1925) (stating Court should devote “time and 
attention and energy . . . to matters of large public concern” and to “preserving 
uniformity”); S. Rep. No. 68-362, at 3 (1924) (“[C]ases should not go to the Supreme 
Court . . . unless the questions involved are of grave public concern or unless serious 
uncertainty attends the decision of the circuit courts of appeal by reason of conflict in the 
rulings of these courts or the courts of the States.”). 
197. H.R. Rep. No. 68-1075, at 2. 
198. 66 Cong. Rec. 2752 (1925) (statement of Sen. Albert Baird Cummins, R-Iowa). 
199. See Hartnett, supra note 73, at 1702–04 (criticizing lack of serious debate). 
200. See, e.g., 66 Cong. Rec. 2753–55, 2921–22 (1925) (statement of Sen. Royal S. 
Copeland, D-N.Y.) (expressing concern because bill did not require review of all 
constitutional questions, but also asserting Court’s “time and labor should, generally 
speaking, be devoted to matters of general interest and importance and not to deciding 
private controversies”); id. at 2757 (statement of Sen. Claude Swanson, D-Va.) (arguing 
Court should have mandatory jurisdiction over rulings invalidating state or federal law). 
201. See Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 96, at 276 (“If lawyers in the Senate had 
doubts about the measure, they were singularly reticent about uttering them. Only Senator 
Walsh of Montana expressed serious disagreement.”); Hartnett, supra note 73, at 1645 
(discussing Senator Walsh’s “lonely fight against the bill”). 
202. 62 Cong. Rec. 8548 (1922) (reprinting speech of Sen. Thomas Walsh, D-Mont.). 
203. See id. at 8545–47 (asserting bill “proposes a radical departure from the system 
devised” by Founders). 
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in diversity cases—by providing for Supreme Court review only of any 
federal question involved.204 
Ultimately, the certiorari expansion—embodied in the Judiciary Act 
of 1925205—went through both chambers of Congress with ease. The 
measure passed the House with virtually no debate and without any 
recorded opposition.206 The Senate passed the bill by a vote of 76-1.207 In 
the end, even Senator Walsh voted in favor of the legislation.208 The bill 
also attracted the support of some progressives who otherwise sought to 
limit the Court’s power, including Senator Borah.209 Other progressives, 
such as Senators Owen and La Follette, simply declined to vote.210  
As Professor William Ross has stated, it seems “ironic that Congress 
increased the power of the [Supreme Court] at the very time that 
agitation by progressives and labor leaders . . . was reaching a new 
intensity.”211 But the strong support for the measure may reflect legis-
lators’ increasing acceptance of the Supreme Court’s settlement 
function.212 As discussed, the Supreme Court sought—and supporters 
                                                                                                                 
204. See id. at 8548–49 (stating “justice delayed is justice denied, and if the work of 
the Supreme Court is accumulating beyond its power to dispatch . . . it is incumbent on 
Congress . . . to grant relief,” and suggesting circuit courts of appeals be given final 
authority in diversity cases, “except as to any Federal question involved”). 
205. Pub. L. No. 68-415, 43 Stat. 936. The Act left in place mandatory jurisdiction 
over (1) state court decisions invalidating a federal statute or treaty; (2) state court 
decisions upholding state law against a constitutional challenge; (3) certain decisions by 
three-judge district courts; (4) certain criminal appeals by the United States; and (5) 
federal appellate court decisions invalidating a state law. Id. § 1, 43 Stat. at 937–39. 
206. See 66 Cong. Rec. 2879–80 (1925) (showing House initially passed bill on 
February 2, 1925, without recorded vote and with no representative opposing certiorari 
expansion); id. at 3005 (showing House passed final bill on February 4, 1925, again 
without recorded opposition).  
207. See id. at 2928 (showing, on February 3, 1925, Senate passed bill by vote of 76-1, 
with nineteen senators abstaining). President Calvin Coolidge signed the bill into law on 
February 13, 1925. Id. at 3747–48. Accordingly, in the end, the legislation was enacted with 
only one recorded dissent: Senator James Heflin voted against the 1925 reform, stating 
that he did not “think it [was] right to withdraw from the citizen the right to appeal to the 
highest courts in the land if he wants to appeal.” Id. at 2928 (statement of Sen. James 
Heflin, D-Ala.). Senator Heflin had not previously raised any objection during the floor 
debates over the bill. 
208. See id. at 2926, 2928 (statement of Sen. Thomas Walsh, D-Mont.) (reiterating 
view that Supreme Court should have mandatory jurisdiction over all federal question 
cases but also stating “my criticism . . . seems to have had no response” and “I do not feel 
like standing alone on the matter”); see also Hartnett, supra note 73, at 1700 (asserting 
“[i]f Senator Walsh had continued in his opposition, he could have . . . perhaps killed the 
bill”). 
209. 66 Cong. Rec. 2928. 
210. Id. 
211. Ross, supra note 150, at 253. 
212. Indeed, many supporters of the 1925 Act argued that it would facilitate the 
Court’s capacity to provide a uniform resolution of important federal questions. See 
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argued for—the certiorari expansion specifically on the ground that the 
reform was needed to preserve the Court’s role in resolving important 
federal questions.213 So there is good reason to believe that progressives 
who voted for the measure did so because they saw value in the Court’s 
role in settling disputed federal issues—or, at least, they concluded that 
the benefits of that settlement function exceeded the costs of any 
“erroneous” decisions.214 Indeed, even critics of the certiorari expansion 
argued that the Supreme Court’s “primary function . . . is to give an au-
thoritative interpretation of Federal law.”215 The principal area of conten-
tion was how best to ensure that the Court could perform this crucial 
function. Thus, even more so than in 1891, the 1925 Judiciary Act seems 
to have been premised on a view that the “real function” of the Supreme 
Court is to “settle” important questions of federal law.216 
IV. EXCEPTIONS IN MODERN AMERICA 
The political support for the Supreme Court’s settlement function 
was also evident in the mid to late twentieth century. The federal judici-
ary was once again a subject of intense political conflict during this era, 
although this time the objections came primarily from conservatives. 
Socially conservative Republicans and conservative Southern Democrats 
strongly objected to Supreme Court decisions involving abortion, re-
apportionment, desegregation, criminal justice, and religion. Accord-
                                                                                                                 
Procedure in Federal Courts Hearing, supra note 184, at 20–21 (providing general 
overview of bill and stating bill would “restrict the docket of [the Supreme Court] so as to 
enable it to dispose of the present arrears and to keep up with current business without 
interfering with [its] highest function of interpreting the Constitution and preserving 
uniformity of decisions by the intermediate courts of appeals”); H.R. Rep. No. 68-1075, at 
2 (1925) (stating, absent certiorari expansion, “the court is hindered from hearing and 
determining more important cases and from efficiently functioning in the performance of 
its highest duty of interpreting the Constitution and preserving uniformity of decision by 
the intermediate courts of appeals”). 
213. See supra notes 184–189, 196–198 and accompanying text (describing how 
proponents of certiorari expansion argued it would help Court focus on significant federal 
issues). 
214. Indeed, Senator Cummins was explicit about this. See, e.g., 66 Cong. Rec. 2755 
(statement of Sen. Albert Baird Cummins, R-Iowa) (making clear that, in his view, 
Supreme Court’s job was “not only to maintain a correct interpretation [of the 
Constitution] but to make that interpretation uniform or fairly uniform throughout the 
country” and further stating, absent certiorari expansion, Court could not do “its work 
with reasonable promptitude”). 
215. 62 Cong. Rec. 8548 (1922) (reprinting speech of Sen. Thomas Walsh, D-Mont.); 
see also 66 Cong. Rec. 2753–55 (statement of Sen. Royal S. Copeland, D-N.Y.) (criticizing 
lack of mandatory appellate review in all constitutional cases and stating Supreme Court’s 
“time and labor should, generally speaking, be devoted to matters of general interest and 
importance,” such as resolution of all federal constitutional questions). 
216. Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court Hearing, supra note 184, at 22 (statement of 
James C. McReynolds, J., U.S. Supreme Court). 
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ingly, they sought to strip both Supreme Court and lower federal court 
jurisdiction over these constitutional claims.217 Those efforts were, how-
ever, blocked by social progressives who generally supported the Court’s 
civil rights jurisprudence.218 
But, once again, these competing political factions came together to 
protect the Supreme Court’s constitutional role. Congress enacted a 
series of statutes during this period expanding the Court’s certiorari 
jurisdiction. Finally, in 1988, Congress enacted—with no apparent oppo-
sition—a statute granting the Court discretionary review over virtually 
every appeal. 
A. The Exceptions Clause as a Shield Versus a Sword 
The legislative debates over one judiciary bill nicely illustrate the 
political dynamics surrounding jurisdictional measures during this era. A 
proposal to strip federal jurisdiction in school prayer cases was attached 
to a measure that would have substantially expanded the Supreme 
Court’s certiorari power.219 Although progressives and conservatives 
fought bitterly over the jurisdiction-stripping proposal, both sides en-
dorsed the effort to protect the Supreme Court. 
1. An Early Effort to Expand Certiorari Review. — The 1925 Judiciary Act 
provided temporary relief, but it did not solve the Court’s workload 
problems. In the latter half of the twentieth century, the Court’s docket 
grew further,220 in part because of the expanding federal administrative 
state, and also because of changes in the Court’s own doctrine, which 
recognized a number of new constitutional rights (particularly in the 
area of criminal procedure).221 The Court also faced increasing 
                                                                                                                 
217. See Edward Keynes & Randall K. Miller, The Court vs. Congress: Prayer, Busing, 
and Abortion 195–203, 221–25, 292–98 (1989) (discussing efforts to strip jurisdiction over 
abortion, busing, and school prayer); Max Baucus & Kenneth R. Kay, The Court Stripping 
Bills: Their Impact on the Constitution, the Courts, and Congress, 27 Vill. L. Rev. 988, 991 
(1982) (noting efforts to strip jurisdiction over reapportionment and Miranda issues). 
218. See Grove, Structural Safeguards, supra note 66, at 900–10, 935–37 (noting 
social progressives, mainly Democrats, “consistently maintained sufficient structural veto 
points to preserve federal jurisdiction”).  
219. See infra Part IV.A.2 (discussing Helms Amendment to strip federal jurisdiction 
over school prayer cases after Supreme Court struck down state laws mandating prayer in 
public schools).  
220. See Epstein et al., supra note 173, at 65–67 tbl.2-2 (showing Supreme Court’s 
caseload rose from 1,321 in 1950, to 4,761 in 1975, to 8,965 in 2000). 
221. See David M. O’Brien, Managing the Business of the Supreme Court, 45 Pub. 
Admin. Rev. 667, 669 (1985) (noting “Congress inflated the docket by expanding 
opportunities for the government and special-interest groups to appeal directly to the 
court” for issues such as “appeals from dismissals of criminal prosecutions”). In 1976, 
Congress also eliminated the remaining amount-in-controversy requirements for appeal to 
the Supreme Court. Richard H. Fallon, Jr. et al., Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts 
and the Federal System 746 (6th ed. 2009). 
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challenges in overseeing the lower courts because of a sharp increase in 
their workload. For example, between 1960 and 1983, the number of 
filings in federal district courts rose from approximately 80,000 to 
280,000 cases per year, and those in the courts of appeals grew in similar 
proportion (from approximately 3,800 to nearly 30,000 cases per year).222 
As in the early twentieth century, Congress recognized that the 
demand on the federal judiciary was creating a caseload crisis at the 
Supreme Court. As a result, in the 1970s, Congress enacted a series of 
statutes that reduced the Court’s mandatory appellate jurisdiction in 
specified areas, such as antitrust.223 However, once again, this piecemeal 
approach did little to relieve the Court.224 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court—this time led by Chief Justice 
Warren Burger—called for more substantial reform. In successive letters 
to Congress, the Court sought a dramatic extension of certiorari juris-
diction to enable it to settle important federal questions.225 In one such 
                                                                                                                 
222. See Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform 61, 64 (1985) 
(reporting that, from 1960–1983, filings in district court rose from 79,200 to 277,031, and 
those in appellate courts rose from 3,765 to 29,580). 
223. See Act of Aug. 12, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-381 §§ 1–3, 90 Stat. 1119, 1119 
(reducing number of cases in which three-judge district court is required, thereby 
eliminating source of direct appeals); Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, Pub. L. No. 
93-528 § 5, 88 Stat. 1706, 1709 (1974) (abolishing virtually all direct appeals in antitrust 
actions); Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-644, § 14, 84 Stat. 1880, 1890 
(1971) (eliminating direct appeals by United States in criminal cases). These statutes, 
much like the 1925 Act, were designed to address the Court’s caseload crisis, see H.R. Rep. 
No. 94-1379, at 4 (1976) (stating “the limited resources of the Supreme Court are strained 
by the direct appeal” from three-judge district courts); S. Rep. No. 94-204, at 4–5 (1975) 
(“Although [direct appeals from three-judge district courts] . . . account for only a small 
portion . . . of all cases docketed in the Supreme Court, they consume a disproportionate 
amount of the limited time for argument in the Supreme Court.”), and to allow the Court 
to focus on important federal questions, see H.R. Rep. No. 93-1463, at 12–13 (1974) 
(“[O]nly cases of general public importance in the administration of justice may be 
appealed directly to the Supreme Court . . . .”); S. Rep. No. 93-298, at 4 (1973) (“Under 
the [antitrust] proposal only those cases of general public importance would be 
appealable directly to the Supreme Court . . . .”). 
224. There were other suggestions for how the Court could best address its capacity 
constraints. Much of the debate focused on the possible creation of a national court of 
appeals to assist the Court, particularly in resolving lower court conflicts. See Comm’n on 
Revision of the Fed. Court Appellate Sys., Structure and Internal Procedures: 
Recommendations for Change 45–51 (1975) (recommending National Court of Appeals 
to hear cases referred by Supreme Court or transferred from federal courts of appeals); 
Fed. Judicial Ctr., Report of the Study Group on the Case Load of the Supreme Court 18–
24 (1972) (recommending National Court of Appeals to take on part of Supreme Court’s 
workload). These proposals were, however, criticized by some Justices and scholars, and 
“ultimately the idea withered away.” Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, 
The Supreme Court’s Plenary Docket, 58 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 737, 741–42 (2001). 
225. See Letter from C.J. William Rehnquist to Rep. Robert. W. Kastenmeier (May 
11, 1988), in 134 Cong. Rec. 13,511 (1988) (“The effective elimination of mandatory 
jurisdiction . . . has for many years been the primary legislative goal of the Court.”); see 
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letter, the Court stated, “To the extent that we are obligated by statute to 
devote our energies to [the] less important cases [within our mandatory 
jurisdiction], we cannot devote our time and attention to the more 
important issues and cases constantly pressing for resolution” each 
term.226 
The executive branch under both Democratic and Republican ad-
ministrations once again supported the Court’s request for relief. A 
commission chaired by President Gerald Ford’s Solicitor General, Robert 
Bork, strongly “recommend[ed] that the remaining mandatory appellate 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court be abolished.”227 President Jimmy 
Carter’s Solicitor General, Wade McCree, agreed, emphasizing that this 
reform was essential to allow the “one supreme Court” created by the 
Constitution to oversee the growing federal business of the nation.228 
Senator Dennis DeConcini led several early efforts to expand the 
Court’s certiorari jurisdiction in order to facilitate the Supreme Court’s 
settlement function.229 He agreed with the Justices that the existing juris-
dictional scheme “impair[ed] the Court’s ability” to provide a “definitive 
resolution” of important federal questions.230 The elimination of 
mandatory appellate review was necessary to enable the Court “to effec-
                                                                                                                 
also Letter from Supreme Court of the United States to Rep. Kastenmeier (June 17, 1982), 
in H.R. Rep. No. 100-660, at 27–28 (1988) [hereinafter Court Letter to Kastenmeier] 
(“The only solution to the problem, and one that is consistent with the intent of the 
Judiciary Act of 1925 to give the Supreme Court discretion to select those cases it deems 
most important, is to eliminate or curtail the Court’s mandatory jurisdiction.”); Letter 
from Supreme Court of the United States to Sen. DeConcini (June 22, 1978), in S. Rep. 
No. 96-35, at 15–16 (1979) [hereinafter Court Letter to DeConcini] (“Various Justices 
have spoken out publicly on the issue on prior occasions, all stating essentially the view 
that the Court’s mandatory jurisdiction should be severely limited or eliminated 
altogether.”). 
226. Court Letter to DeConcini, supra note 225, at 15. 
227. Dep’t of Justice Comm. on Revision of the Fed. Judicial Sys., The Needs of the 
Federal Courts (1977), reprinted in State of the Judiciary and Access to Justice: Hearings 
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, & the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 535 (1977). 
228. Supreme Court Jurisdiction Act of 1978: Hearing on S. 3100 Before the 
Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th 
Cong. 2 (1978) [hereinafter Supreme Court Jurisdiction Act of 1978: Hearing] (statement 
of Hon. Wade McCree, Solicitor Gen. of the United States) (arguing discretionary review 
was needed to “maintain the viability of this constitutional concept of a single Supreme 
Court as the population . . . has grown enormously and the volume of litigation has 
correspondingly burgeoned”). 
229. See 125 Cong. Rec. 7632–33 (1979) (describing Senator DeConcini’s efforts in 
1979); S. Rep. No. 95-985, at 1 (1978) (showing Senator DeConcini’s similar efforts to 
expand certiorari jurisdiction in 1978).  
230. 125 Cong. Rec. 7633 (statement of Sen. Dennis DeConcini, D-Ariz.); see also S. 
Rep. No. 96-35, at 7 (“A significant number of petitioners for certiorari whose cases involve 
issues of considerable importance are being denied access to the Court simply because the 
Court has no time to hear them due to the crush of obligatory appeals.”).  
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tuate its constitutional mission of resolving only those matters that are of 
truly national significance.”231 
The report of the Senate Judiciary Committee emphasized that 
Congress had ample power under the Exceptions Clause to enact the 
reform: 
[A]n “appeal” to any Federal appellate court, including the 
Supreme Court, is solely a creature of legislative choice. . . . In 
establishing the Court’s appellate jurisdiction under Article III, 
Congress can confer as much or as little compulsory jurisdiction 
as it deems necessary and proper, including such exceptions as 
Congress thinks appropriate. If Congress wants to make the Court’s 
appellate jurisdiction totally discretionary or totally obligatory in 
nature, nothing in the Constitution says “no.” See Ex parte 
McCardle, 7 Wall. 506 (1869).232 
Under the DeConcini bill, Congress would use that broad authority 
to ensure that the Court could continue to perform its crucial “function 
as expositor of the national law.”233 
2. The “Helms Amendment” to Strip Jurisdiction over School Prayer. — 
During this era, Senator Jesse Helms led an effort to strip federal juris-
diction over school prayer cases.234 He sought to attach his proposal to 
various bills and, in 1979, the jurisdiction-stripping measure became part 
of the DeConcini bill.235 
                                                                                                                 
231. 125 Cong. Rec. 7633 (statement of Sen. Dennis DeConcini, D-Ariz.). 
232. S. Rep. No. 96-35, at 2–3 (emphasis added) (citations omitted); accord S. Rep. 
No. 95-985, at 3 (same). The citation to Ex parte McCardle may be surprising. The Court in 
that case provided one of the broadest declarations of Congress’s exceptions power, 
holding that Congress could strip the Court’s appellate jurisdiction over a pending case. 
Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 513–15 (1868). Yet, here, McCardle was used to 
support a bill that would strengthen the Court’s constitutional role. McCardle is discussed 
in more detail in Part V.B.1, infra. 
233. S. Rep. No. 96-35, at 2 (asserting existing mandatory appellate jurisdiction 
“imposes burdens on the Justices that may hinder the Court in the performance of its 
function as expositor of the national law”). 
234. See Louis Fisher, Religious Liberty in America: Political Safeguards 130 (2002) 
(noting Senator Helms “took the lead in promoting this type of court-stripping bill” and 
began introducing such measures in 1974). 
235. The school prayer proposal was initially attached to a bill to create the 
Department of Education. See 125 Cong. Rec. 7581 (indicating senators voted to attach 
Helms’ amendment to bill). However, a few days later, the measure was removed from the 
education bill and attached to the certiorari measure. Id. at 7631, 7644. Notably, Senator 
Helms preferred to leave his school prayer amendment on both bills. He was worried (as it 
turned out, with good reason) that the House Judiciary Committee, which would have 
jurisdiction over the DeConcini bill, would be hostile to his jurisdiction-stripping measure. 
See id. at 7630 (statement of Sen. Jesse Helms, R-N.C.) (“[T]here is great doubt that the 
House will even have an opportunity to vote on [the measure] once it goes to the House 
Judiciary Committee.”); infra notes 252–258 and accompanying text (discussing judiciary 
committee’s opposition to Helms’s proposal). 
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Senator Helms argued that the Supreme Court erred when it struck 
down state laws requiring the recitation of prayer in public school236 and 
insisted that Congress had ample authority under the Exceptions Clause 
to correct such mistakes: 
In anticipation of judicial usurpations of power, the framers of 
our Constitution wisely gave the Congress the authority, by a 
simple majority of both Houses, to check the Supreme Court by 
means of regulation of its appellate jurisdiction. Section 2 of 
article III states in clear and unequivocal language that the 
appellate jurisdiction of the Court is subject to “such excep-
tions, and under such regulations as the Congress shall 
make.”237 
Social progressives strongly opposed this jurisdiction-stripping effort. 
And, although they sought to defend the federal judiciary as a whole,238 
the progressives were particularly concerned about the “assault on the 
Supreme Court.”239 Thus, Senator Birch Bayh asserted that the bill, if 
enacted, would set “a very dangerous precedent” that would make it 
easier for future Congresses to strip the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction 
over other constitutional issues.240 Others, including Senator Ted 
Kennedy, expressed concern about the uniform enforcement of federal 
law, arguing that it would be unwise to leave the resolution of federal 
constitutional questions to fifty different states.241 
In response, Senator Helms pointed to prior jurisdiction-stripping 
bills, including proposals to strip the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction over 
reapportionment cases and Miranda issues, as “precedents” to support 
                                                                                                                 
236. See 125 Cong. Rec. 7577 (statement of Sen. Jesse Helms, R-N.C.) (asserting “the 
Court went beyond the language of the establishment clause” in invalidating state laws in 
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), and School District of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 
(1963)). 
237. 125 Cong. Rec. 7579 (statement of Sen. Jesse Helms, R-N.C.) (quoting U.S. 
Const. art. III, § 2). 
238. See id. at 7644 (statement of Sen. John Durkin, D-N.H.) (“This type of 
restriction . . . , once applied in this instance, will become ever easier to apply in the future 
[and] . . . [t]he result will be to weaken, if not cripple, the independence of the Federal 
judiciary . . . .”). 
239. Id. at 7631 (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy, D-Mass.); see also id. at 7579 
(statement of Sen. Abraham Ribicoff, D-Conn.) (opposing Helms amendment in large 
part because it “challenge[d] the authority of the Supreme Court”). 
240. Id. at 7654 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh, D-Ind.); see also id. (statement of Sen. 
Edward Kennedy, D-Mass.) (arguing if Congress adopted measure, “we will establish a 
precedent that the Congress will be able to take any action, involving individual rights . . . 
and remove jurisdiction of that matter from the Federal courts and the Supreme Court”). 
241. See id. at 7632 (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy, D-Mass.) (“We are going to 
run into a situation in which 50 States could have 50 different interpretations of what the 
law of the land is . . . .”). 
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the constitutionality and propriety of his school prayer measure.242 
Senator Kennedy responded, however, that those precedents actually 
undermined Helms’ arguments, because those prior bills had been uni-
formly rejected by Congress.243  
As with other jurisdiction-stripping measures during this era, the 
competing political factions in Congress were sharply divided over the 
school prayer proposal.244 But the political dynamics were strikingly 
different during discussions of the underlying DeConcini bill. Both sides 
agreed on the need to expand the Supreme Court’s discretionary review 
power.245 
Thus, social progressives “strongly support[ed]” the certiorari 
measure, arguing that it would serve the “worthy goal” of allowing the 
Supreme Court to focus on the most significant cases.246 And social con-
servatives supported both the certiorari expansion and the Helms 
amendment. Senator DeConcini serves as an example. Even as he tried 
to protect the Supreme Court’s overall “constitutional mission” of 
resolving important issues of federal law, he endorsed the effort to 
eliminate the Court’s role in school prayer cases.247  
Likewise, Senator Strom Thurmond was a leading proponent of 
both measures. He strongly endorsed the Helms amendment,248 asserting 
that Congress had “the right to make that exception” to the Supreme 
                                                                                                                 
242. See id. at 7636 (statement of Sen. Jesse Helms, R-N.C.) (providing historical 
examples of Congress imposing limitations on Supreme Court jurisdiction). 
243. Id. (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy, D-Mass.) (“The fact is that none of 
those [bills] is law.”). 
244. See Grove, Structural Safeguards, supra note 66, at 900–16, 935–39 (describing 
how social progressives repeatedly defeated conservatives’ efforts to strip federal 
jurisdiction). 
245. Only two senators expressed opposition to the certiorari expansion. But their 
opposition was largely limited to one issue—whether individual states ought to have a right 
to appeal to the Supreme Court. See 125 Cong. Rec. 7646 (statement of Sen. James 
McClure, R-Idaho) (stating bill would “disrupt[] the rights of the States to an appeal, as a 
matter of right, to the highest Court of the land”); id. at 7646 (statement of Sen. Robert 
Morgan, D-N.C.) (arguing “[t]he right of a litigant . . . —and especially the right of a 
sovereign State—to have an appeal . . . is very important to me”). Notably, this objection 
appears to have disappeared by the time the legislation was enacted in 1988. No one raised 
this concern. 
246. Id. at 7632 (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy, D-Mass.) (supporting certiorari 
expansion, which would “insure fair consideration of matters which should be decided by 
the Supreme Court”). 
247. Senator DeConcini voted in favor of adding the Helms amendment to both the 
Department of Education bill and his Supreme Court Jurisdiction Act. See id. at 7581, 
7644, 7648; see also id. at 7633 (statement of Sen. Dennis DeConcini, D-Ariz.) (expressing 
support for Helms amendment). 
248. See 125 Cong. Rec. 7639 (statement of Sen. Strom Thurmond, D-S.C.) (“[I]t 
does not make any sense to say that little children cannot voluntarily pray at school . . . .”). 
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Court’s appellate jurisdiction.249 But Senator Thurmond also argued that 
Congress had both the power and the duty to expand the Court’s 
certiorari review power250: 
[I]t is time once again for the legislative branch to respond to 
increasing pressures on our Supreme Court by adjusting its 
appellate jurisdiction. . . . Obviously, our Supreme Court is 
being forced to spend a significant portion of its time on certain 
cases from its obligatory docket at the expense of cases present-
ing issues of national importance which it might have chosen to 
hear.251 
The Senate ultimately passed the entire bill by a wide margin, with 
the support of socially conservative Republicans and Southern 
Democrats.252 But the bill faced resistance in the House of 
Representatives. After a fifteen-month delay, a subcommittee held hear-
ings on the bill.253 Although the subcommittee members favored the 
DeConcini bill, they could not support that reform when it was 
accompanied by a jurisdiction-stripping provision.254 
The subcommittee members expressed particular concern about the 
proposed restriction on Supreme Court review. Representative Robert 
McClory and others worried about uniformity, stating that the elimina-
tion of Supreme Court oversight could lead to “a situation in which 50 
States could have 50 different interpretations of what the law of the land 
is.”255 And Representative Harold Sawyer stated that, although he was 
                                                                                                                 
249. Id. 
250. Id. at 7647 (“Neither article III nor the due process clause of the Constitution 
requires . . . any absolute right to ‘appeal’ to the Supreme Court. It is for Congress to 
determine how much of the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction is to be compulsory 
and how much of it is to be discretionary.”). 
251. Id. at 7648. 
252. See id. (showing bill passed Senate by vote of 61-30); Grove, Structural 
Safeguards, supra note 66, at 936 (showing breakdown of votes). 
253. See Prayer in Public Schools and Buildings—Federal Court Jurisdiction: 
Hearing on S. 450 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, & the Admin. of Justice 
of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., at i (1981) [hereinafter Prayer in Public 
Schools Hearing] (showing subcommittee began hearings in July 1980, despite Senate 
passage of bill in April 1979). 
254. For example, Representative Robert Kastenmeier separately sponsored bills to 
expand the Supreme Court’s certiorari jurisdiction. See 134 Cong. Rec. 13,510 (1988) 
(statement of Rep. Robert Kastenmeier, D-Wis.) (proposing bill to provide Court with 
greater discretion in selecting cases to review); 130 Cong. Rec. 24,815–16 (1984) (same); 
128 Cong. Rec. 24,302–04 (1982) (same). But he strongly opposed the Helms 
amendment. See Prayer in Public Schools Hearing, supra note 253, at 3 (statement of Rep. 
Robert Kastenmeier, D-Wis.) (stating he was “troubled by the prospect . . . of denying 
citizens access to the Federal courts with regard to an important constitutional issue”). 
255. Prayer in Public Schools Hearing, supra note 253, at 9–10 (Rep. Robert 
McClory, R-Ill.) (stating he opposed Helms amendment on this ground, although he 
favored voluntary prayer in public schools); see also id. at 2 (statement of Rep. Robert 
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“in favor of allowing voluntary prayer in the schools,” he was deeply 
concerned that it might encourage future efforts to “deprive the 
Supreme Court of any jurisdiction to cover the due process clause, or 
civil rights, or equal treatment” and thereby “virtually emasculate the 
Bill of Rights.”256 
One legislator sought to have the bill removed from the Judiciary 
Committee and sent to the House floor.257 But the House never voted 
on the measure. Thus, as the House Judiciary Committee later stated, 
this early effort to expand the Supreme Court’s certiorari jurisdiction 
failed “because of the addition of a non-germane, controversial” 
jurisdiction-stripping provision.258 
B. Expansion of Discretionary Review in the 1988 Judiciary Act 
In the ensuing years, the Supreme Court continued to request relief. 
Successive House and Senate judiciary committees repeatedly recom-
mended an expansion of certiorari jurisdiction,259 and the Reagan 
Administration also strongly endorsed the reform.260 Ultimately, in 1988, 
                                                                                                                 
Kastenmeier, D-Wis.) (“Conceivabl[y] this could result in 50 interpretations of the 
meaning of the first amendment.”). 
256. Id. at 26 (statement of Rep. Harold Sawyer, R-Mich.). 
257. See Keynes & Miller, supra note 217, at 200 (describing effort by Rep. Philip 
Crane, R-Ill., to send bill to House with goal of restoring voluntary prayer in public 
schools). 
258. H.R. Rep. No. 100-660, at 4 (1988). 
259. See S. Rep. No. 100-300, at 1 (1988) (commenting bill would give Supreme 
Court discretion to review important federal issues); H.R. Rep. No. 100-660, at 2 (same); 
H.R. Rep. No. 98-986, at 1 (1984) (same); H.R. Rep. No. 97-824, at 2 (1982) (same); S. 
Rep. No. 96-35, at 1 (1979) (same); S. Rep. No. 95-985, at 1 (1978) (same). 
260. See Court Reform and Access to Justice Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Courts, Civil Liberties, & the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th 
Cong. 205 (1987) [hereinafter Hearing on Court Reform] (statement of Stephen 
Markman, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Policy, U.S. Dep’t of Justice) (“The 
Department has long supported making the Court’s docket generally discretionary.”); 
Court Improvements Act of 1983: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts of the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 15 (1983) (statement of Jonathan Rose, Assistant 
Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice) (“[T]he current system hinders the resolution of . . . 
questions of public importance.”). The Reagan Justice Department did at one point 
suggest that the Court retain mandatory appellate jurisdiction over lower court decisions 
invalidating federal statutes. The Department of Justice argued that these cases would not 
unduly burden the Court, and that Supreme Court oversight was needed to ensure a 
“single, national, uniform law of the land.” Hearing on Court Reform, supra, at 270 
(statement of Stephen Markman, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Policy, U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice) (asserting Supreme Court could handle “very, very small number of cases” in 
which lower courts invalidated federal laws, especially given that “[b]y and large, those 
would be cases of such significance that the Supreme Court would probably want to deal 
with those anyway under its discretionary authority”). 
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Congress enacted—with no opposition—a statute granting the Court 
certiorari jurisdiction over virtually every appeal.261 
The Judiciary Act of 1988 was built on the same premises as the 
original DeConcini bill. Congress continued to rely on its broad power 
under the Exceptions Clause to “confer as much or as little compulsory 
jurisdiction as it deems necessary and proper, including such exceptions 
as Congress thinks appropriate.”262 
Moreover, Congress sought to use that authority to promote the 
Supreme Court’s settlement function. Thus, a House Judiciary 
Committee report stated that the reform would enable the Court to 
perform its two “principal functions”: (1) “to resolve cases involving 
principles . . . of wide public importance”; and (2) “to ensure uniformity 
and consistency in the law by resolving conflicts” among the lower 
courts.263 The committee report further stated: 
During the past several terms, a substantial percentage of the 
Court’s workload has been devoted to mandatory cases that do 
not have significant public importance. . . . Many other petitions 
from the circuit courts have to be left unsettled. Some of these 
appeals . . . identify serious conflicts between circuits. Some of 
the neglected cases concern individual rights . . . [or] the 
delicate balance of powers in our Federal Union. . . .  
. . . Elimination of the Court’s mandatory jurisdiction, although 
not a panacea . . . , is a necessary step to relieving the Court’s 
calendar crisis.264 
The 1988 Act was thus the “logical culmination” of the legislative 
trend that began in 1891.265 Congress recognized that the Court’s manda-
tory appellate jurisdiction dated from the “early days of the Federal judi-
ciary, when there was adequate time to dispose of every appeal on its 
merits.”266 But, by the late twentieth century, this appellate review system 
                                                                                                                 
261. Act of June 27, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-352, 102 Stat. 662; see also 134 Cong. Rec. 
4465 (1988) (showing Senate passed measure by voice vote without any senator expressing 
opposition); id. at 13,512 (showing House passed measure under suspension of rules 
without any representative expressing opposition). 
262. S. Rep. No. 100-300, at 3. The report continued: “If Congress wants to make the 
Court’s appellate jurisdiction totally discretionary or totally obligatory in nature, nothing 
in the Constitution would prevent such action.” Id. (citing Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 
Wall.) 506 (1869)). 
263. H.R. Rep. No. 100-660, at 14 (1988); see also S. Rep. No. 100-300, at 4 (“History 
has shown that imposing . . . mandatory functions on the Supreme Court tends to weaken 
the Court’s capacity both to control its own docket and to confine its labors to those cases 
of national importance.”). 
264. H.R. Rep. No. 100-660, at 14; accord H.R. Rep. No. 98-986, at 13–14 (1984). 
265. S. Rep. No. 100-300, at 2. 
266. Id. at 3 (“The right to appeal . . . evolved out of the early days of the Federal 
judiciary, when there was adequate time to dispose of every appeal on its merits and when 
the need for developing discretionary limitations and short cuts in disposing of enormous 
case filings was yet unknown.”). 
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was “outmoded.”267 This scheme “detract[ed] from the Court’s ability . . . 
to effectuate its constitutional mission of resolving only those matters 
that are of truly national significance”268 and “ensur[ing] uniformity and 
consistency in the law by resolving conflicts” among the lower courts.269 
Accordingly, as in 1891 and 1925, Congress used its broad exceptions 
power to enable the Court to “pronounce uniform and authoritative 
rules of federal law.”270  
V. THE SCOPE AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE EXCEPTIONS CLAUSE SAFEGUARD 
Congress has repeatedly used its power over federal jurisdiction to 
facilitate what scholars see as the Supreme Court’s central constitutional 
function: defining the content of federal law for the judiciary. Thus, 
Congress has steadily expanded the Court’s appellate jurisdiction to 
encompass virtually every case arising under federal law. When these 
jurisdictional expansions created workload crises at the Court, Congress 
enacted “exceptions” that enabled the Court to focus its limited 
resources on settling important federal questions. Congress has not, of 
course, always used its broad exceptions power to protect the Court. 
Nevertheless, contrary to conventional wisdom, the Exceptions Clause 
has served largely to facilitate what scholars view as the Supreme Court’s 
essential role in the constitutional scheme. 
A. The Structural Safeguards of Supreme Court Review 
The Exceptions Clause empowers Congress to enact beneficial ex-
ceptions that promote the Supreme Court’s constitutional role. But the 
Clause is not the only structural protection for the Court. Instead, as 
explained below, the Exceptions Clause works in conjunction with other 
structural constraints in Articles I and II to ensure the Court’s role in re-
solving disputed federal questions. 
1. The Exceptions Clause as an Article III Safeguard. — The Supreme 
Court can serve a crucial settlement function in the judicial system. 
Supreme Court decisions establish the boundaries of permissible 
governmental and private conduct and thereby provide focal points 
around which political actors and citizens can coordinate their actions. 
For this reason, legislators have an incentive to enact jurisdictional 
regulations that facilitate the Court’s role in settling the contours of 
federal law. The Exceptions Clause serves as a structural safeguard 
precisely because it gives Congress the power to act on those political 
                                                                                                                 
267. H.R. Rep. No. 100-660, at 11. 
268. 125 Cong. Rec. 7633 (1979) (statement of Sen. Dennis DeConcini, D-Ariz.). 
269. H.R. Rep. No. 100-660, at 14. 
270. Bator, supra note 3, at 1039. 
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incentives and enact exceptions that promote the Supreme Court’s 
constitutional role.  
As we have seen on multiple occasions, Congress’s efforts to expand 
Supreme Court jurisdiction—in order to broaden its role in defining the 
content of federal law—have themselves imperiled the Court’s constitu-
tional role. The Constitution calls for “one supreme Court.”271 But as the 
volume of federal cases increased, it became “utterly impossible for [that 
one Court] to pass upon all litigation that involves a Federal question.”272 
As a result, the Justices repeatedly called upon Congress to enact legisla-
tion that would enable this single tribunal to oversee the federal business 
of a growing nation. 
In the late nineteenth century, Chief Justice Waite urged Congress 
to use its broad authority under the Exceptions Clause to address the 
Court’s burgeoning caseload. He argued that the Supreme Court’s 
“appellate jurisdiction is subject entirely to congressional control” and 
sought legislation that would “help to make the . . . Court what its name 
implies, a powerful auxiliary in the administration of justice,” rather than 
“an obstacle standing in the way” of the final resolution of cases.273 Chief 
                                                                                                                 
271. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1. 
272. Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court Hearing, supra note 184, at 22 (statement of 
James C. McReynolds, J., U.S. Supreme Court) (“It is utterly impossible for us to pass upon 
all litigation that involves a Federal question, and if we undertake to do it the delay will be 
intolerable.”). There have been suggestions to divide the Supreme Court into panels in 
order to enable it to deal with its mounting workload. But these (and similar proposals to 
delegate the work of the Supreme Court) have not found favor in Congress or among 
many of the Justices. See Jurisdiction of Circuit Courts Hearing, supra note 183, at 3 
(statement of William Howard Taft, C.J., U.S. Supreme Court) (“We could not adopt [the 
panel approach] because our Constitution provides that there shall be one Supreme 
Court, and it is doubtful whether you could constitutionally divide the court into two 
parts.”); supra note 224 (discussing rejection of such proposals in 1970s and 1980s). In 
1890, the Senate discussed the issue at length after a minority report of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee suggested dividing the Supreme Court into three panels that would 
hear cases on behalf of the Court. See S. Rep. No. 51-1571, at 3–5 (1890) (Minority Rep.) 
(asserting Congress’s power to make “exceptions” and “regulations” enabled it to provide 
“that any three or other convenient number of the justices may proceed at the same time 
to hear arguments and pronounce decisions” on behalf of Court). But the Senate 
overwhelmingly rejected the proposal—largely on constitutional grounds. See 21 Cong. 
Rec. 10,316 (1890) (showing Senate voted 36-10 against proposal); id. at 10,227 (statement 
of Sen. Joseph Dolph, R-Or.) (“The power of Congress to provide regulations for the 
exercise of [the Court’s] jurisdiction can not be held to extend to legislation which would 
break up the Supreme Court into fragments and substitute several courts . . . for the one 
Supreme Court provided by the Constitution.”); id. at 10,286 (statement of Sen. John 
Spooner, R-Wis.) (stating he could “not vote for” minority proposal because he had “some 
doubt . . . as to its constitutionality,” given constitutional provision for “‘one Supreme 
Court’”). Thus, even assuming arguendo that Congress could divide the Supreme Court 
into panels, such a measure has not been politically viable. Congress has accordingly 
needed to find another way for the “one Supreme Court” to oversee the federal business 
of a growing nation.  
273. Waite, supra note 114, at 318.  
980 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 113:929 
  
Justices Taft and Burger renewed this call in the next century. They 
insisted that “[t]he business of the [Supreme Court] is rapidly 
increasing,” and unless Congress reduced its remaining mandatory 
appellate jurisdiction, it would be impossible for the Court “to dispatch 
promptly, as it should, the important questions which it is organized to 
settle.”274 
Each time, the political branches responded by making exceptions 
to the Supreme Court’s mandatory appellate jurisdiction and granting it 
discretionary certiorari review. Executive officials argued that this reform 
was essential to allow the “one Supreme Court” created by the 
Constitution to continue to resolve cases “of public moment.”275 
Members of Congress agreed that mandatory appellate review 
“impair[ed] the Court’s ability” to provide a “definitive resolution” of 
disputed federal questions.276 Accordingly, Congress enacted exceptions 
that would enable the Court to concentrate its limited resources on 
“resolv[ing]” important issues of federal law and “ensur[ing] uniformity 
and consistency in the law by resolving conflicts” among the lower 
courts.277 
                                                                                                                 
274. Jurisdiction of Circuit Courts Hearing, supra note 183, at 1 (statement of 
William Howard Taft, C.J., U.S. Supreme Court); see also Court Letter to Kastenmeier, 
supra note 225, at 28 (“The . . . burdens posed by the mandatory jurisdiction provisions 
still on the books are nevertheless substantial and continue to cause the Court to expend 
its limited resources on cases that are better left to other courts.”); Court Letter to 
DeConcini, supra note 225, at 15 (asserting certiorari review would enable Court to 
“devote . . . [its] time and attention to the more important issues and cases constantly 
pressing for resolution” each term). 
275. Supreme Court Jurisdiction Act of 1978: Hearing, supra note 228, at 2 
(statement of Hon. Wade McCree, Solicitor Gen. of the United States) (arguing 
discretionary review was needed to “maintain the viability of this constitutional concept of 
a single Supreme Court as the population . . . has grown enormously and the volume of 
litigation has correspondingly burgeoned”); see also Second Annual Message of President 
Calvin Coolidge, supra note 189, at 2662 (asserting discretionary review would allow Court 
to focus on cases “of public moment”); Annual Report of the Attorney General of the 
United States for the Year 1885, supra note 117 at 42–43 (advocating discretionary review 
scheme that would allow Court to resolve federal questions that were “novel and of 
sufficient importance to justify the appeal”).  
276. 125 Cong. Rec. 7633 (1979) (statement of Sen. Dennis DeConcini, D-Ariz.); see 
also S. Rep. No. 96-35, at 7 (1979) (stating “the Court has no time to hear [important 
cases] due to the crush of obligatory appeals”); S. Rep. No. 95-985, at 7 (1978) (“A 
significant number of petitioners for certiorari whose cases involve issues of considerable 
importance are being denied access to the Court simply because the Court has no time to 
hear them due to the crush of obligatory appeals.”); H.R. Rep. No. 68-1075, at 2 (1925) 
(“Having to hear numbers of cases of trivial character . . . , the [Court] is hindered 
from . . . performance of its highest duty of interpreting the Constitution and preserving 
uniformity of decision [on federal questions]”). 
277. H.R. Rep. No. 100-660, at 14 (1988); see also 21 Cong. Rec. 3405 (1890) 
(statement of Rep. David Culberson, D-Tex.) (asserting Supreme Court should “retain, as 
far as practicable, a supervisory control over all questions . . . within the judicial power of 
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Absent the Exceptions Clause, it is not clear that Congress would 
have had the authority to make these needed adjustments to the Court’s 
appellate jurisdiction.278 Notably, there is widespread agreement among 
jurists and scholars that Congress has little to no power over the Supreme 
Court’s original jurisdiction, which of course is not qualified by the 
Exceptions Clause.279 If the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction were 
likewise “insulated from congressional regulation,” it is not clear that 
Congress could have removed classes of cases from the Court’s manda-
tory appellate oversight.280 
                                                                                                                 
the United States, to the end that uniformity of decision may be enforced throughout the 
entire judicial system of the United States”). 
278. It is conceivable, of course, that the Supreme Court might have had the 
inherent “judicial power” to create a discretionary review scheme. But the Justices 
repeatedly asserted that they lacked such authority. See, e.g., Jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court Hearing, supra note 184, at 21 (statement of James C. McReynolds, J., U.S. Supreme 
Court) (“We simply can not attend to [every] . . . Federal question . . . . So we are face to 
face with a practical question, and there is no relief except through Congress.”). 
279. See, e.g., California v. Arizona, 440 U.S. 59, 65 (1979) (“The original jurisdiction 
of the Supreme Court is conferred not by the Congress but by the Constitution itself. This 
jurisdiction is self-executing, and needs no legislative implementation.”); John Harrison, 
The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts and the Text of Article 
III, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 203, 209 (1997) (arguing “Congress may not add to or subtract from 
[the Court’s] original jurisdiction”); Redish, Congressional Power, supra note 12, at 901 
(“[T]he Court’s relatively limited original jurisdiction . . . is unequivocally insulated from 
congressional regulation.”). But see Akhil Reed Amar, Marbury, Section 13, and the 
Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 443, 444 (1989) (arguing 
Congress may reduce Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction in cases in which State is party 
because judicial power does not extend to “all” such suits). Congress would presumably 
still have the power to make laws that are necessary and proper to carry out the Supreme 
Court’s appellate review power. See David E. Engdahl, Intrinsic Limits of Congress’ Power 
Regarding the Judicial Branch, 1999 BYU L. Rev. 75, 80 (asserting most of “Congress’ 
power regarding the judiciary derives . . . [from] the Necessary and Proper Clause”). 
However, as David Engdahl has argued, the Exceptions Clause seems to authorize 
“exceptions” and “regulations” that would not be permitted by the Necessary and Proper 
Clause alone. See id. at 155 (asserting Exceptions Clause “enlarge[s] Congress’ 
discretion”). Thus, it is at least debatable whether, absent the Exceptions Clause, Congress 
would have the power to remove classes of cases from the Court’s mandatory appellate 
jurisdiction. That may be particularly true with respect to constitutional and other federal 
claims, given that Article III states that the Court “shall have appellate Jurisdiction” over 
“all . . . cases” arising under federal law. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2; cf. Amar, supra, at 
444 (arguing Congress may not “deprive the Supreme Court of original jurisdiction” over 
cases if Article III provides for review of “all” such cases). The Exceptions Clause therefore, 
at a minimum, removes any doubt about Congress’s power. 
280. Redish, Congressional Power, supra note 12, at 901. That was the understanding 
of at least some jurists and legislators when certiorari jurisdiction was first created in 1891. 
See 21 Cong. Rec. 3403–04 (1890) (statement of Rep. David Culberson, D-Tex.) (“The 
Supreme Court was designed to be, mainly, an appellate tribunal. Its original 
jurisdiction . . . was fixed by the Constitution, and Congress can not add to or subtract 
from it.”); Waite, supra note 114, at 318 (“The [Supreme Court’s] original jurisdiction 
is . . . fixed by the Constitution, and it cannot be taken away by Congress, but the appellate 
jurisdiction is subject entirely to congressional control.”). 
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The presence of the Exceptions Clause removes any doubt about 
Congress’s power. The Clause ensures that the “legislative branch [may] 
respond to increasing pressures on our Supreme Court” by transferring 
cases from its mandatory to its discretionary jurisdiction.281 Indeed, 
legislators have repeatedly asserted that such “exceptions” to the Court’s 
appellate jurisdiction are “within the easy reach of Congress.”282 Thus, 
“[t]he authority vested in Congress to make exceptions to and regulate 
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court” enables Congress to 
“shield that great tribunal . . . from an excessive burden of litigation and 
conform its appellate jurisdiction to the enormous growth of the business 
of the country.”283 
2. The Structural Safeguards of Article I and Article II. — The Exceptions 
Clause is not the only structural protection for the Supreme Court. Nor 
is it sufficient; political actors’ interest in preserving the Court’s 
settlement function does not necessarily deter them from proposing 
court-curbing measures. As this Article has shown, even when legislators 
generally see value in the Supreme Court’s role in resolving federal 
questions, they may still be happy to eliminate the Court’s power to rule 
on specific issues. For example, although Senators DeConcini and 
Thurmond sought to protect the Court’s long-term “function as 
expositor of the national law,”284 they also endorsed Senator Helms’ 
efforts to make an “exception” in school prayer cases.285 
                                                                                                                 
281. 125 Cong. Rec. 7648 (statement of Sen. Strom Thurmond, D-S.C.) (“[I]t is time 
once again for the legislative branch to respond to increasing pressures on our Supreme 
Court by adjusting its appellate jurisdiction.”). 
282. 21 Cong. Rec. 3403–04 (statement of Rep. David Culberson, D-Tex.) (“The 
authority vested in Congress to make exceptions to and regulate the appellate jurisdiction 
of the Supreme Court was granted for the purpose of enabling the Congress to adapt the 
appellate jurisdiction of the court to the varying demands of the business, trade, and 
commerce of the country . . . .”); see also S. Rep. No. 100-300, at 3 (1988) (“[U]nder 
Article III, Congress can confer as much or as little compulsory jurisdiction as it deems 
necessary and proper, including such exceptions as Congress thinks appropriate.”); S. 
Rep. No. 96-35, at 2–3 (1979) (“If Congress wants to make the Court’s appellate 
jurisdiction totally discretionary or totally obligatory in nature, nothing in the Constitution 
says ‘no.’”); 125 Cong. Rec. 7647 (statement of Sen. Strom Thurmond, D-S.C.) (“There 
can be no doubt that it is within the powers of Congress to . . . [expand certiorari 
review] . . . [and] [i]t is for Congress to determine how much of the Supreme Court’s 
appellate jurisdiction is to be compulsory . . . [or] discretionary.”); 66 Cong. Rec. 2752 
(1925) (statement of Sen. Albert Cummins, R-Iowa) (contending Congress may “restrict or 
reduce the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court . . . in order to enable it fairly to 
meet the demands that are made upon it”). 
283. 21 Cong. Rec. 3404 (statement of Rep. David Culberson, D-Tex.). 
284. 125 Cong. Rec. 7633 (statement of Sen. Dennis DeConcini, D-Ariz.). 
285. See supra notes 247–249 and accompanying text (noting both Senator 
DeConcini and Senator Thurmond supported Helms’ amendment).  
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Drawing on earlier work,286 this Article suggests that other structural 
and political constraints built into the constitutional scheme serve to 
protect the judiciary against such court-curbing attempts. These addi-
tional structural safeguards help ensure that Congress uses its power over 
federal jurisdiction to facilitate, rather than to undermine, the Supreme 
Court’s constitutional role. 
The first barrier to jurisdiction-stripping legislation is the lawmaking 
process of Article I, which requires all federal legislation to pass through 
two chambers of Congress and be presented to the President.287 These 
lawmaking procedures create a supermajority requirement for every 
piece of federal legislation and thereby give political factions (even 
political minorities) considerable power to veto legislation.288 
Recent social science research suggests that political actors are likely 
to use this structural veto to block court-curbing proposals. Political 
scientists assert that, in this politically divided society, the overall content 
of federal court decisions is generally favored by at least one major 
political faction.289 Such supporters of the judiciary have a strong 
incentive to veto court-curbing measures.290 
                                                                                                                 
286. See generally Tara Leigh Grove, The Article II Safeguards of Federal 
Jurisdiction, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 250 (2012) [hereinafter Grove, Article II Safeguards] 
(arguing executive branch can act to protect against jurisdiction-stripping measures); 
Grove, Structural Safeguards, supra note 66 (highlighting bicameralism and presentment 
as critical safeguards of federal jurisdiction). 
287. U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
288. See James M. Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Legal 
Foundations of Constitutional Democracy 233–36 (1962) (observing difficulties of passing 
laws in bicameral legislature without inclusive coalitions); John F. Manning, What Divides 
Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 70, 77 (2006) (“[T]he lawmaking 
procedures prescribed by Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution and the congressionally 
prescribed rules of legislative procedure unmistakably afford political minorities 
extraordinary power to block legislation or insist upon compromise as the price of 
assent . . . .”). 
289. See Whittington, Political Foundations, supra note 42, at 18 (“Political actors 
defer to . . . courts because the judiciary can be useful to their own political and 
constitutional goals . . . .”); Graber, supra note 43, at 43 (“[P]oliticians may facilitate 
judicial policymaking in part because they . . . believe that the courts will announce those 
policies that they . . . favor . . . .”). Notably, this political support is tied to the 
constitutional structure. The appointment and confirmation process established by the 
Constitution (requiring both presidential and senatorial approval) effectively guarantees 
that each federal judge has been selected by a dominant political group. See U.S. Const. 
art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Thus, the process helps ensure that, at least at the outset, a judge’s views 
on constitutional and other legal issues align to some degree with those of political 
leaders. 
290. The author’s prior work has focused on jurisdiction stripping. But political 
supporters of the judiciary should also be inclined to block other court-curbing measures, 
such as Senator Borah’s effort to impose a supermajority requirement on the Court. See 
supra notes 161–163 and accompanying text (examining efforts by progressives to limit 
Court’s judicial review). 
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The above historical account illustrates the importance of this struc-
tural protection.291 In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
when populists and progressives sought to curtail federal judicial power, 
economic conservatives blocked those court-curbing efforts. Indeed, in 
the 1920s, conservatives ensured that the “exceptions” and “regulations” 
proposed by Senators Borah and Owen never even emerged from com-
mittee. In more modern times, when social conservatives sought to strip 
jurisdiction over constitutional claims like school prayer, social progres-
sives used their structural veto in the House of Representatives to protect 
the judiciary. 
Moreover, these lawmaking procedures seem to work particularly 
well to protect the Supreme Court’s appellate review power. As the 
debates over the school prayer measure illustrate, political supporters of 
the judiciary are especially inclined to use their Article I veto to defend 
the Court.292 And even political opponents of the judiciary (who support 
efforts to strip lower federal court jurisdiction) have spoken out against 
attempts to eliminate the Supreme Court’s appellate review power, 
emphasizing the Court’s “role . . . in establishing uniform standards” of 
federal law.293 
There is an additional structural safeguard for the Supreme Court: 
the executive branch. The executive has various tools at its disposal to 
oppose constitutionally questionable legislation. The President can veto 
or threaten to veto problematic legislation.294 The executive can also use 
                                                                                                                 
291. For a more extensive description of the previously discussed examples and 
additional historical support, see Grove, Structural Safeguards, supra note 66, at 890–916. 
292. See, e.g., 125 Cong. Rec. 7631 (1979) (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy, D-
Mass.) (criticizing school prayer measure as “assault on the Supreme Court”); Grove, 
Structural Safeguards, supra note 66, at 920–21 (“The structural safeguards of Article I 
thus seem to be particularly effective at preserving what scholars have described as the 
Supreme Court’s ‘unique role’ in the judiciary.”). 
293. 152 Cong. Rec. 15,074 (2006) (statement of Rep. Melvin Watt, D-N.C.). 
Representative Watt made his comment during debates over a proposal to strip federal 
jurisdiction over challenges to the use of “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance. In 
2004, Representative Watt sought (unsuccessfully) to amend the bill so that it applied only 
to the lower courts. See H.R. Rep. No. 108-691, at 77–78 (2004) (“I certainly don’t believe 
that [stripping federal jurisdiction] would be advisable, because the result . . . [would] 
leave an absolute hodgepodge of final opinions, which I just think would be a terrible 
public policy result.”); see also 150 Cong. Rec. H7393 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 2004) (statement 
of Rep. Judy Biggert, R-Ill.) (supporting Watt amendment, which “took care of . . . 
renegade [lower court] jurists, but . . . retained the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court”). 
The bill passed the House in 2004 and 2006, but was blocked by social progressives in the 
Senate. See Grove, Structural Safeguards, supra note 66, at 911–16, 938–39. 
294. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (“If . . . [the President] approve[s] [of the bill] 
he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections . . . .”); Charles M. 
Cameron, Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power 3, 9–10 (2000) 
(examining “how presidents use vetoes and veto threats to wrest policy concessions from 
Congress”). 
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its role in enforcing federal laws to ensure that laws are applied in a 
manner that accords with constitutional values.295  
Social science research suggests that the executive branch should be 
inclined to use this constitutional authority to safeguard the Supreme 
Court’s appellate review power. Scholars have argued that the President 
often advances his constitutional philosophy through litigation in the 
federal courts.296 Accordingly, the President has some incentive to 
protect the Supreme Court’s authority to decide constitutional claims. 
These presidential incentives are reinforced by the institutional incen-
tives of the Department of Justice (DOJ).297 The Solicitor General is in 
charge of virtually all federal litigation in the Supreme Court.298 Thus, as 
                                                                                                                 
295. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 3 (“[The President] shall take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed . . . .”); Dawn E. Johnsen, Presidential Non-Enforcement of 
Constitutionally Objectionable Statutes, Law & Contemp. Probs., Winter/Spring 2000, at 
7, 9 (“Presidents often avoid constitutional problems, as they should, through their 
interpretation of ambiguous statutes or through the exercise of enforcement discretion.”). 
296. See Howard Gillman, Party Politics and Constitutional Change: The Political 
Origins of Liberal Judicial Activism, in The Supreme Court and American Political 
Development 138, 146–55 (Ronald Kahn & Ken I. Kersch eds., 2006) (discussing efforts of 
Kennedy and Johnson Administrations to appoint judges who would favor civil rights and 
other progressive causes); Whittington, Political Foundations, supra note 42, at 274 
(arguing presidents often “[t]urn[] to the judiciary . . .  [to] advanc[e] constitutional 
goals”). 
297. For the DOJ’s institutional incentives, this Article draws on social science 
theories of path dependence and institutional entrenchment. Social scientists have argued 
that institutions, like the judiciary, may become “entrenched” (or “locked in”), in part 
because they serve as sources of power and influence for other groups in society. See Paul 
Pierson, Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis 159 (2004) (“The 
emergence of courts as the site of political and legal dispute resolution generates a rapid 
expansion of law-centered actors who have a considerable stake in preserving and 
expanding the use of these procedures . . . .” (footnote omitted)). This theory helps 
explain why the DOJ has an incentive to defend the federal judiciary. The DOJ’s main job 
is to litigate cases in the federal courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 516 (2006) (“Except as otherwise 
authorized by law, the conduct of litigation in which the United States . . . is interested . . . 
is reserved to officers of the Department of Justice, under the direction of the Attorney 
General.”). The DOJ’s power and influence within the executive branch is therefore 
greatest when decisions are hammered out in litigation. Moreover, as discussed below, this 
theory suggests that the DOJ has especially good reason to defend the Supreme Court, 
because the Solicitor General is essentially the government’s exclusive representative at 
that level. See infra notes 298–299 and accompanying text. 
298. See 28 U.S.C. § 518(a) (“Except when the Attorney General in a particular case 
directs otherwise, the Attorney General and the Solicitor General shall conduct and argue 
suits and appeals in the Supreme Court . . . in which the United States is interested.”); FEC 
v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 513 U.S. 88, 93 (1994) (“[I]f a case is one ‘in which the 
United States is interested, . . . it must be conducted and argued in this Court by the 
Solicitor General or his designee.’” (quoting United States v. Providence Journal Co., 485 
U.S. 693, 700 (1988))). Notably, before the Solicitor General was created in 1870, see An 
Act to Establish the Department of Justice, ch. 150, §§ 1–2, 16 Stat. 162 (1870), the 
Attorney General was the government’s exclusive representative in the Supreme Court. 
See Judiciary Act of 1789 § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92–93. 
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former Solicitor General Drew Days stated, “Once cases reach the 
Supreme Court, the Solicitor General plays an important role in the de-
velopment of American law” and can have a substantial “impact upon the 
establishment of constitutional and other principles.”299 This institutional 
position gives the DOJ a strong interest in protecting the Supreme 
Court’s appellate review power. 
These institutional incentives undoubtedly help explain the 
executive branch’s steadfast (and bipartisan) support for certiorari 
measures.300 Empowering the Supreme Court to resolve important fed-
eral questions enhances the executive’s own influence over the 
development of federal law. But the same incentives also help explain the 
executive’s repeated opposition to efforts to strip the Supreme Court’s 
appellate jurisdiction.301 For example, in response to the school prayer 
proposal (and similar measures), President Ronald Reagan’s first 
Attorney General, William French Smith, issued an Office of Legal 
Counsel (OLC) opinion concluding that Congress lacks the power to 
eliminate Supreme Court review of constitutional claims.302 The Attorney 
General reasoned that such an “exception” to the Court’s appellate juris-
diction “would intrude upon [its] core functions . . . as an independent 
and equal branch in our system of separation of powers.”303 He stated, 
“The integrity of our system of federal law depends upon a single court 
of last resort having a final say on the resolution of federal questions.”304 
These structural constraints help explain why proposals to strip the 
Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction have been repeatedly defeated in 
the legislative process.305 Indeed, even when Congress has enacted 
                                                                                                                 
299. Drew S. Days, III, Executive Branch Advocate v. Officer of the Court: The 
Solicitor General’s Ethical Dilemma, 22 Nova L. Rev. 679, 680 (1998). 
300. Indeed, during the debates over the 1891 reform, even as many Democratic 
legislators were reluctant to empower the Supreme Court, Attorneys General of both 
political parties supported the creation of discretionary review. See supra note 117 and 
accompanying text (noting support of Attorneys General under both Republican and 
Democratic Presidents). 
301. See Grove, Article II Safeguards, supra note 286, at 268–86 (describing executive 
branch’s opposition to such efforts during Franklin Roosevelt, Eisenhower, Kennedy, 
Carter, and Reagan Administrations). 
302. Constitutionality of Legislation Withdrawing Supreme Court Jurisdiction to 
Consider Cases Relating to Voluntary Prayer, 6 Op. O.L.C. 13 (1982). 
303. Id. at 14. 
304. Id. at 26; see also Nomination of Edwin Meese III: Hearing Before the S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 185–86 (1984) (statement of Edwin Meese) (arguing 
Congress lacks power to “diminish or take away the core functions of the Supreme 
Court”). 
305. See Grove, Article II Safeguards, supra note 286, at 268–90 (recounting 
executive’s efforts to defend Court’s jurisdiction); Grove, Structural Safeguards, supra 
note 66, at 890–916 (recounting how supporters of judiciary blocked efforts to strip 
Court’s appellate jurisdiction over school prayer, busing, reapportionment, and challenges 
to Defense of Marriage Act and to use of “under God” in Pledge of Allegiance).  
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statutes that curtail lower federal court jurisdiction, those laws have gen-
erally left the Supreme Court’s appellate review power in place.306  
These structural provisions work in conjunction with the Exceptions 
Clause to protect the Supreme Court. The structural safeguards of 
Articles I and II make it difficult for Congress to enact “exceptions” that 
undermine the Court’s role in defining the content of federal law. Con-
versely, political actors’ broad and bipartisan interest in preserving the 
Supreme Court’s settlement function helps explain why beneficial “ex-
ceptions” like certiorari review survive the cumbersome bicameralism 
and presentment process. 
B. The Limitations of the Safeguards: Restrictions on Supreme Court Review 
This Article asserts that Congress has an incentive to use—and by 
and large has used—its broad exceptions power to facilitate the Supreme 
Court’s settlement function. But the Article does not further claim that 
Congress will only use its power so as to benefit the Court. In fact, as dis-
cussed below, Congress has on a few occasions restricted the Supreme 
Court’s appellate jurisdiction over a class of claims. 
But one goal of this Article is to show (contrary to the assumption of 
most scholars) that these episodes of jurisdiction stripping are the excep-
tional uses of the Exceptions Clause. As recounted in Parts II–IV, 
Congress has far more often—and over a far wider range of federal 
questions—used its control over federal jurisdiction to facilitate the 
Supreme Court’s settlement function. Furthermore, even these 
jurisdiction-stripping episodes seem more nuanced than scholars have 
sometimes acknowledged: When viewed in a broader context, even these 
episodes reflect to some degree the long-term political pressure on 
Congress to allow for Supreme Court oversight of the lower federal and 
state courts.307 
                                                                                                                 
306. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7, 120 Stat. 2600, 
2635–36 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (2006)) (maintaining limitation on lower courts’ 
jurisdiction without limiting Supreme Court jurisdiction); Detainee Treatment Act of 
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e), 119 Stat. 2680, 2742 (codified as amended at 28 
U.S.C. § 2241(e) (2006)) (restricting federal habeas jurisdiction over claims of noncitizens 
designated as “enemy combatants,” and routing claims to military tribunals followed by 
judicial review in D.C. Circuit and Supreme Court); Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, 
Pub. L. No. 77-421, § 204, 56 Stat. 23, 31–33 (limiting jurisdiction of lower courts, but not 
Supreme Court, to review certain administrative orders); Norris-LaGuardia Act, Pub. L. 
No. 72-65, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 101 (2006)) (restricting inferior 
federal courts’ authority to issue injunctions in labor disputes). The recent war on terror 
legislation is discussed below in Part V.B.2. 
307. Another example warrants mention. In the late 1860s, John Klein, the 
administrator of the estate of a Mississippi cotton farmer, whose property was taken by the 
federal government during the Civil War, sought to recover the proceeds of the deceased’s 
property after the deceased received a presidential pardon. See United States v. Klein, 80 
U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 136–41 (1872). The Court of Claims ruled in favor of Klein, and the 
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1. An Early Exception: The McCardle Episode. — The most famous 
jurisdiction-stripping incident occurred in 1868 and arose out of the 
military reconstruction activities in the post-Civil War South. In 1867, 
William McCardle was detained by federal authorities in Mississippi for 
publishing newspaper articles that severely criticized the military’s 
activities.308 When the lower courts denied habeas relief, McCardle 
                                                                                                                 
government appealed to the Supreme Court. Id. at 143. In 1870, while the case was on 
appeal, Congress enacted a law directing the Court to dismiss such claims “for want of 
jurisdiction.” Act of July 12, 1870, ch. 251, 16 Stat. 230, 235 (“[I]n all cases where 
judgment shall have been heretofore rendered in the court of claims in favor of any 
claimant [based on a pardon] . . . , the Supreme Court shall, on appeal, have no further 
jurisdiction of the cause, and shall dismiss the same for want of jurisdiction.”). The 
Supreme Court invalidated the statute. See Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 147–48 (“[T]he 
legislature cannot change the effect of . . . a pardon any more than the executive can 
change a law.”). Although scholars have debated the precise ground of the Court’s 
decision, see Howard M. Wasserman, Constitutional Pathology, the War on Terror, and 
United States v. Klein, 5 J. Nat’l Security L. & Pol’y 211, 211 & n.2 (2011) (collecting sources 
describing Klein as “opaque” and “deeply puzzling”), it appears that the Court struck down 
the law both as an unconstitutional infringement of the President’s pardon power and as 
an infringement on the judicial power to choose the rule of decision for a particular case. 
See Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 147–48 (“The court . . . is required to disregard pardons . . . 
and to deny them their legal effect . . . [and] [t]his certainly impairs the executive 
authority and directs the court to be instrumental to that end.”).  
Notably, as the Supreme Court observed, the statute at issue in Klein was not a 
jurisdiction-stripping law akin to those discussed in this Article. See id. at 145–46 (“[T]he 
language of the proviso shows plainly that it does not intend to withhold appellate 
jurisdiction except as a means to an end.”). The statute granted the Court jurisdiction to 
hear claims raised by former confederates. But when (as in Klein) the Court of Claims had 
ruled in favor of the former confederate, the statute directed the Supreme Court to 
overrule that decision and rule for the government—by dismissing the claim for “want of 
jurisdiction.” See id. at 146 (“The court has jurisdiction of the cause to a given point; but 
when it ascertains that a certain state of things exists, its jurisdiction is to cease and it is 
required to dismiss the cause for want of jurisdiction.”). Indeed, the Court even suggested 
that the law was not an exercise of Congress’s exceptions power. The Court stated: 
If [the Act] simply denied the right of appeal in a particular class of cases, 
there could be no doubt that it must be regarded as an exercise of the power of 
Congress to make “such exceptions from the appellate jurisdiction” as should 
seem to it expedient. But the language of the proviso shows plainly that it does 
not intend to withhold appellate jurisdiction except as a means to an end. Its 
great and controlling purpose is to deny [effect] to pardons granted by the 
President. . . . It seems to us that this is not an exercise of the acknowledged 
power of Congress to make exceptions and prescribe regulations to the 
appellate power . . . . 
Id. at 145–46; see also id. at 147 (suggesting there is difference between law interfering 
with “judicial power,” as 1870 Act did, and one restricting Court’s appellate jurisdiction). 
Nevertheless, this example does suggest that Congress may not always exercise its power 
over federal jurisdiction in a manner that benefits the Court. 
308. See William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Ex parte McCardle, 15 Ariz. L. 
Rev. 229, 236 (1973) (describing McCardle’s arrest, detainment, and charges). 
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sought Supreme Court review under the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, 
challenging the constitutionality of the reconstruction laws.309 
Notably, during the late 1860s, Congress was controlled by the 
Republican Party, in large part because the (predominantly Democratic) 
representatives of the defeated Southern states were excluded from the 
legislature.310 This Republican Congress was heavily invested in the 
reconstruction efforts and other civil rights reforms in the South.311 (The 
party did not turn its focus to economic nationalism until the 1870s.312) 
Thus, while the McCardle case was pending, several House Republicans 
introduced a bill to repeal the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction 
under the 1867 Act.313 Although the Democrats in Congress strongly op-
posed this jurisdiction-stripping effort,314 the Reconstruction Republicans 
had considerable majorities in Congress and the bill passed both 
chambers with ease.315 
The measure was temporarily blocked when President Andrew 
Johnson vetoed it, asserting that any attempt to prevent Supreme Court 
review of a constitutional claim was “not in harmony with the spirit and 
intention of the Constitution.”316 But the delay was short-lived. The 
Republicans had no difficulty assembling the two-thirds majority neces-
sary to override the veto and enact the jurisdiction-stripping 
legislation.317  
                                                                                                                 
309. Id. at 237–38; see also Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385, 386 
(allowing appeals against adverse rulings toward writs of habeas corpus by lower courts). 
310. See 2 Bruce Ackerman, We The People: Transformations 104 (1998) (noting, 
during this era, “Congress excluded all representatives . . . from the Southern states”); 
Historical Statistics, supra note 94, at 5-201 (showing Republican control of Congress in 
late 1860s). 
311. See supra note 89 (describing how Republican Party focused on civil rights 
immediately following Civil War). 
312. See id. (noting Republican Party’s shift from civil rights to building strong 
national economy). 
313. See Van Alstyne, supra note 308, at 239 (“[A] rider was introduced in the house 
of representatives . . . to strike at McCardle’s pending case.”).  
314. See Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 2167 (1868) (statement of Rep. George 
Woodward, D-Penn.) (declaring bill was motivated “merely by a desire to prevent the 
Supreme Court . . . from deciding McCardle’s case” out of fear that Court would invalidate 
reconstruction laws); Grove, Structural Safeguards, supra note 66, at 933 (showing 
Democrats voted 38-1 against jurisdiction-stripping bill). 
315. See Historical Statistics, supra note 94, at 5-201 (showing Republicans had 143-
49 majority in House and 42-11 majority in Senate); Van Alstyne, supra note 308, at 239 
(noting measure passed House with no debate and was subject to very little debate before 
passing Senate). 
316. Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 2094 (showing, on March 25, 1868, President 
Johnson vetoed bill on constitutional grounds). 
317. See Act of Mar. 27, 1868, ch. 34, 15 Stat. 44 (repealing Habeas Corpus Act of 
1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385); Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 2128 (showing Senate voted 
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In Ex parte McCardle, the Supreme Court applied this newly estab-
lished limit on its appellate jurisdiction and dismissed McCardle’s 
appeal.318 The Court went on to state, however, that the 1868 legislation 
had not cut off all avenues of appellate review.319 As the Court later ex-
plained in Ex parte Yerger, it could still review lower court decisions 
denying habeas relief by way of an original petition under the Judiciary 
Act of 1789.320 
The 1868 repeal resulted from the unusual political circumstances 
of that era.321 In the late 1860s, “Congress excluded all representatives, 
however qualified they may have been, from the Southern states.”322 Ac-
cordingly, in stark contrast to the other historical periods examined 
here, the most likely political supporters for the Court (in this case, 
Southern Democrats) had no power to block the proposed jurisdiction-
stripping measure.323 The Reconstruction Republicans thus easily 
managed not only to push the measure through Congress but also to 
override President Johnson’s veto. The structural safeguards of both 
Article I and Article II failed to protect the Court. 
But the story of Congress’s authority over the Supreme Court’s 
appellate jurisdiction did not end with the 1868 repeal. Over the next 
decade, as lower federal courts issued rulings in habeas cases not subject 
to review under the 1789 Act, Congress grew increasingly concerned 
about the lack of Supreme Court oversight.324 The House Judiciary 
Committee issued a report recommending that Congress restore the 
                                                                                                                 
33-9 to override President Johnson’s veto on March 26, 1868); id. at 2170 (showing House 
voted 114-34 to override veto on March 27, 1868). 
318. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 515 (1869). 
319. See id. at 515 (“The act of 1868 does not except from that jurisdiction any cases 
but appeals from Circuit Courts under the act of 1867. It does not affect the jurisdiction 
which was previously exercised.”). 
320. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 105–06 (1869). 
321. See Grove, Structural Safeguards, supra note 66, at 923–24, 926 (noting 
Republicans easily obtained jurisdiction-stripping measure in absence of resistance from 
Southern representatives). 
322. Ackerman, supra note 310, at 102–04. 
323. See id. (questioning legality of Congress during this period). 
324. Congress’s primary concern was that lower federal courts were granting habeas 
relief in cases that did not warrant it. See H.R. Rep. No. 48-730, at 4 (1884) (“Since the 
passage of the act of 1867, and especially since that portion of it allowing an appeal to the 
Supreme Court of the United States was repealed, Federal judges have assumed and 
exercised an almost unlimited jurisdiction in granting writs of habeas corpus.”); 15 Cong. 
Rec. 4710 (1884) (statement of Rep. Luke Poland, R-Vt.) (stating Supreme Court review 
was needed because “[i]nferior Federal judges . . . have made themselves really a court of 
error over the decisions of the highest State tribunals”). In McCardle and Yerger, the Court 
interpreted the 1789 Act to permit original petitions by prisoners who were denied habeas 
relief. But the Court had no jurisdiction when the lower court improperly granted a 
habeas petition. See Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 106; McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 513–14.  
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Court’s direct appellate review power in habeas cases.325 The report 
described the 1868 repeal as a political error that could “only be excused 
upon the ground that the fierce and bitter feeling engendered by the 
[Civil War] had not then sufficiently abated for cool and dispassionate 
legislation.”326 
In 1885, Congress corrected that mistake. Legislators voted—with 
very little debate and without recorded dissent—to restore the Court’s 
appellate jurisdiction.327 Thus, once again, political actors seemed to find 
value in the Supreme Court’s settlement function. In this context, 
Congress enabled the Court to define the “true limits” of federal judicial 
power in habeas cases.328 
2. Modern Exceptions: AEDPA and MCA. — Congress again limited the 
Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction in two statutory provisions that 
were part of larger reform efforts. One restriction was part of the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).329 The 
statute requires an inmate to obtain leave from a federal court of appeals 
before filing a successive habeas petition and provides that “[t]he grant 
or denial of [such] an authorization . . . shall not be appealable and shall 
not be the subject of a petition . . . for a writ of certiorari.”330 
Notably, the story of AEDPA differs, in important respects, from the 
events of 1868. First, the statute was not a sudden exercise of legislative 
will but instead the culmination of years of habeas reform efforts.331 Nor 
was the statute targeted at the Supreme Court in the same way as the 
1868 repeal; on the contrary, other provisions of the law expressly recog-
                                                                                                                 
325. H.R. Rep. No. 48-730, at 6. 
326. Id. at 4. 
327. Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 353, 23 Stat. 437; see also 16 Cong. Rec. 2480–81 (1885) 
(showing Senate passed bill with no debate regarding bill’s substance); 15 Cong. Rec. 4710 
(1884) (showing House passed bill with no opposition). The President signed the measure 
into law on March 3, 1885. 16 Cong. Rec. 2570. 
328. H.R. Rep. No. 48-730, at 6 (“With this right of appeal restored, the true extent of 
the act of 1867, and the true limits of the jurisdiction of the Federal courts and judges 
under it, will become defined, and it can then be seen whether further legislation is 
necessary.”). The Judiciary Committee report suggested that, if the Supreme Court did not 
rein in the lower federal courts, then Congress might enact legislation doing so. See id. at 
5–6. But the statute did not contain any limitation on the scope or nature of Supreme 
Court review, thus allowing the Court to favor habeas petitioners. Cf. Wiecek, supra note 
89, at 348 (observing 1867 statute ultimately served in twentieth century “as the basic 
authorization for extensive federal supervision of justice in the state court system”). 
329. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
28 U.S.C.). 
330. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E) (2006). 
331. See Carrie M. Bowden, Note, The Need for Comity: A Proposal for Federal 
Court Review of Suppression Issues in the Dual Sovereignty Context After the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 60 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 185, 215–16 
(2003) (“Congress considered habeas corpus reform for many years prior to the 
enactment of AEDPA . . . .”). 
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nize a special role for the Court in defining the content of federal law.332 
Perhaps most importantly, the restriction in AEDPA is confined to 
successive habeas petitions. Thus (in sharp contrast to the 1868 
measure), it applies only to cases that could have previously reached the 
Supreme Court on at least two occasions—on direct appeal from the 
original state court conviction and on appeal from the first round of fed-
eral habeas review. 
Yet, in litigation over the appellate review provision, the executive 
branch encouraged the Supreme Court to construe the restriction even 
more narrowly. The Solicitor General urged the Court to permit review 
of successive petitions via an original habeas action under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2241.333 The Solicitor General emphasized that, so construed, the 
statute would not offend the Constitution because it would leave open an 
avenue for the Court “to serve as expositor of the federal constitutional 
rules governing criminal prosecutions.”334 The Supreme Court in Felker v. 
Turpin adopted that narrow construction, holding that although AEDPA 
prohibited a direct appeal from a lower court “gatekeeping” decision, it 
had “not repealed [the Court’s] authority to entertain original habeas 
petitions.”335 
The second restriction on the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction was part 
of the legislation enacted in response to the war on terror. Notably, as 
with AEDPA, the relevant statutes largely preserved the Court’s appellate 
review power. The Detainee Treatment Act (DTA) and the Military 
Commissions Act (MCA) were designed to eliminate federal habeas juris-
diction over the claims of alleged enemy combatants.336 But these statutes 
left open an avenue for Supreme Court review. Most of the detainees’ 
claims were routed to a military tribunal (either a combatant status 
                                                                                                                 
332. AEDPA directs inferior federal courts to respect final state court decisions in 
criminal cases unless they violate “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the 
Supreme Court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Such a provision may signal a “congressional belief 
that the Supreme Court’s powers with respect to . . . federal law are broader than those of 
the lower federal courts,” because of its “supreme hierarchical position” in the judiciary. 
Vicki C. Jackson, Introduction: Congressional Control of Jurisdiction and the Future of 
the Federal Courts—Opposition, Agreement, and Hierarchy, 86 Geo. L.J. 2445, 2454–55 
(1998). 
333. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 11–12, Felker v. Turpin, 518 
U.S. 651 (1996) (No. 95-8836), 1996 WL 277112, at *12 (“Title I of the Act, however, does 
not divest this Court of its jurisdiction to entertain original petitions for habeas corpus.”).  
334. Id. at 26. 
335. 518 U.S. 651, 660–61 (1996).  
336. See MCA § 2241, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600, 2635–36 (2006) (codified 
at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(1) (2006)) (eliminating any “writ of habeas corpus filed by or on 
behalf of . . . an enemy combatant”); DTA § 1005(e), Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2680, 
2742 (2005) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(1) (2006)) (stating “no court, justice, or 
judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider . . . an application for writ of habeas 
corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by the Department of Defense at 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba”). 
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review tribunal or a military commission), followed by judicial review in 
the D.C. Circuit and the Supreme Court.337 
One provision of the MCA does, however, purport to restrict the 
Supreme Court’s jurisdiction. The MCA prohibits any federal court from 
reviewing an action “against the United States or its agents relating to any 
aspect of the . . . conditions of confinement” of a designated “enemy 
combatant.”338 Several scholars assert that this provision is unconstitu-
tional to the extent that it precludes federal jurisdiction over constitu-
tional claims.339 For example, Janet Alexander has argued that “the 
complete denial of judicial review of constitutional claims is beyond 
Congress’s power under the Exceptions . . . Clause,” because it deprives 
the Supreme Court of its “essential role.”340 
The Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the validity of the 
“conditions of confinement” provision.341 But whatever its ultimate 
fate,342 that provision of the MCA (together with the 1868 repeal and the 
                                                                                                                 
337.  MCA § 950g, 120 Stat. at 2622–24; DTA § 1005(e)(2)(A), (C), 119 Stat. at 2742. 
Although the DTA gives the D.C. Circuit “exclusive” jurisdiction to review decisions of 
combatant status review tribunals and does not expressly provide for Supreme Court 
review, such “exclusivity” provisions are generally construed so as to preserve Supreme 
Court review. See, e.g., Administrative Orders Review (Hobbs) Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2342 
(providing “[t]he court of appeals . . . has exclusive jurisdiction to enjoin, set aside, 
suspend . . . , or to determine the validity of . . . final orders” from certain federal 
agencies); Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 750–51 (2002) 
(reviewing court of appeals decision in case brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2342); see also 
Calabresi & Lawson, supra note 1, at 1009 (concluding similarly that DTA left Supreme 
Court review in place). 
338. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(2). 
339. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, 
Substantive Rights, and the War on Terror, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 2029, 2063 (2007) (arguing 
MCA’s “total preclusion of review” violates fundamental “postulate of the constitutional 
structure” that “some court must always be open to hear an individual’s claim to . . . 
judicial redress of a constitutional violation”). 
340. Janet Cooper Alexander, Jurisdiction-Stripping in a Time of Terror, 95 Calif. L. 
Rev. 1193, 1208, 1239 (2007). Professor Alexander also contends that this provision 
violates the Suspension and Due Process Clauses. See id. at 1208. 
341. In Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), the Court struck down the MCA’s 
habeas restrictions on Suspension Clause grounds, concluding that the alternative review 
process (in a military tribunal followed by federal court review) did not provide an 
adequate substitute for habeas corpus. Id. at 792. But the Court declined to rule on the 
validity of the “conditions of confinement” provision. Id. 
342. When the issue does reach the Court, it is unclear whether the Solicitor General 
will advocate a narrow construction of the provision, as he did in the litigation over 
AEDPA. See Grove, Article II Safeguards, supra note 286, at 286–300, 314–18 (discussing 
cases in which DOJ urged courts to construe jurisdictional measures narrowly in order to 
preserve federal jurisdiction over constitutional claims and suggesting that DOJ could 
follow same approach in litigating “conditions of confinement” provision in MCA). The 
federal government has not advocated a narrow construction of the jurisdictional bar in 
recent lower court litigation, and one court of appeals held that the “conditions of 
confinement” provision barred even constitutional claims. See Al-Zahrani v. Rodriguez, 
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“successive petitions” provision of AEDPA) demonstrates that the 
Exceptions Clause may, under some circumstances, present a threat to 
the Supreme Court’s role in resolving federal questions. But the size and 
severity of that threat should be viewed in the larger context. As the full 
story of the McCardle episode demonstrates, although Congress stripped 
the Court’s appellate jurisdiction over a class of habeas cases in 1868, 
Congress later rectified that mistake itself—precisely because legislators 
recognized the benefits of Supreme Court oversight.343 And the more 
recent examples of jurisdictional restrictions (AEDPA and the MCA) 
preserved the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction over a considerable 
number of federal claims. Accordingly, these examples do not contradict 
the central claim of this Article: Congress has by and large used its power 
over federal jurisdiction to facilitate, not to undermine, the Supreme 
Court’s constitutional role. 
C. Preserving the Supreme Court’s Constitutional Role 
The structural provisions of the Constitution have worked well to 
protect the Supreme Court’s role in defining the content of federal law. 
The Exceptions Clause of Article III empowers Congress to enact 
“exceptions” that enable a single Supreme Court to provide guidance on 
federal questions for a growing nation. The structural constraints of 
Articles I and II, in turn, make it difficult for Congress to enact 
“exceptions” that undermine the Court’s capacity to provide such 
guidance. 
Indeed, these structural safeguards have largely met the concerns 
raised by academics in the literature on jurisdiction stripping. As 
discussed, scholars—whether they subscribe to the traditional “plenary 
power” theory or propose broader limits on Congress’s power—agree 
that the Supreme Court has a crucial role in “pronounc[ing] uniform 
and authoritative rules of federal law.”344 But they assume that the 
                                                                                                                 
669 F.3d 315, 319–20 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (holding jurisdictional restriction valid because 
damages remedy against government is not constitutionally required). But the Solicitor 
General could take a different approach in the Supreme Court. Cf. Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 4–5, Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003) (No. 01-1491) (arguing that 
jurisdiction-stripping provision did not bar constitutional claim and noting that this 
position differed from DOJ position in lower courts); see also Grove, Article II Safeguards, 
supra note 286, at 297–300 (discussing Demore v. Kim oral argument and Court’s decision). 
It is also possible that Congress could restore the Court’s appellate review power, as it did 
in 1885. See supra notes 327–328 and accompanying text (discussing how Congress voted 
to restore Court’s appellate jurisdiction in 1885). This Article expresses no view on 
whether the political branches are likely to seek to narrow or repeal the “conditions of 
confinement” provision. 
343. See supra notes 318–328 and accompanying text (discussing support for 
Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction).  
344. Bator, supra note 3, at 1039; see also supra Part I.A (discussing scholarly analysis 
of such concerns). 
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Court’s constitutional role can only be protected by the judiciary. 
Accordingly, they seek to identify a judicially enforceable test—
principally by searching for the original meaning of Article III. 
The above historical account demonstrates that the Supreme Court’s 
constitutional role has been protected over time—not primarily by the 
judiciary, but by the political branches. Congress and the executive 
branch have, through legislative action (and inaction), given content to 
the meaning of “exceptions” and “regulations” in Article III. 
As this Article has addressed, legislators have invoked the Exceptions 
Clause to support a variety of measures pertaining to the Supreme Court, 
including jurisdiction-stripping proposals. For example, in the 1920s, 
Senator Owen argued that Congress could enact “such exceptions and 
such regulations . . . as to prevent the Supreme Court from nullifying acts 
of Congress, or assuming to declare questions of great national policy.”345 
Likewise, Senator Helms stated that “[i]n anticipation of judicial usurpa-
tions of power, the framers of our Constitution wisely gave the Congress 
the authority, by a simple majority of both Houses, to check the Supreme 
Court by means of regulation of its appellate jurisdiction.”346  
Supporters of the judiciary have worried that such “exceptions,” if 
enacted into law, could establish “a very dangerous precedent” that 
would make it easier for future Congresses to strip the Supreme Court’s 
appellate jurisdiction.347 But such measures have, of course, been repeat-
edly blocked by the political process. Social progressives vetoed Senator 
Helms’ school prayer proposal in the House of Representatives, and 
economic conservatives ensured that Senator Owen’s child labor bill did 
not emerge from committee. 
Accordingly, these measures did not establish a precedent that could 
threaten the Supreme Court. Instead, the repeated failure of court-
curbing attempts may have had the opposite impact, enabling supporters 
of the judiciary to denounce subsequent efforts as “unprecedented.”348 
Social progressives adopted that approach in 2004, when social conserva-
tives sought to eliminate federal jurisdiction over challenges to the 
                                                                                                                 
345. 64 Cong. Rec. 3958 (1923) (statement of Sen. Robert Owen, D-Okla.). 
346. 125 Cong. Rec. 7579 (1979) (statement of Sen. Jesse Helms, R-N.C.).  
347. Id. at 7654 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh, D-Ind.) (“We are setting a very 
dangerous precedent that could go far beyond prayer.”). 
348. E.g., 152 Cong. Rec. H5415 (daily ed. July 19, 2006) (statement of Rep. Melvin 
Watt, D-N.C.) (arguing Congress should not strip Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction 
over challenges to use of “under God” in Pledge of Allegiance, and stating “the very idea 
of Congress unilaterally cutting off all Federal court review of a constitutional issue is both 
unprecedented and likely unconstitutional”); see also 125 Cong. Rec. 7654 (statement of 
Sen. Edward Kennedy, D-Mass.) (arguing against Helms amendment in part on ground 
that “we have never in the history of two hundred years of this country effectively denied 
appellate jurisdiction”). 
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Defense of Marriage Act.349 The progressives argued, “If this bill becomes 
law, it will represent the first time in our history that Congress has 
enacted legislation that completely bars any Federal court, including the 
United States Supreme Court, from considering the constitutionality of 
Federal legislation.”350 As Michael Gerhardt has recounted, such argu-
ments from legislative precedent, while not decisive, have considerable 
resonance in Congress.351 
Furthermore, Congress created a crucial precedent by using its ex-
ceptions power to establish discretionary certiorari review in 1891. As 
Felix Frankfurter and James Landis observed in the 1920s, the establish-
ment of discretionary jurisdiction “had to overcome a deep professional 
feeling against taking away from litigants the right to resort to the 
Supreme Court for vindication of their federal claims.”352 But once 
Congress established this precedent, it became far easier for Congress to 
expand certiorari review throughout the twentieth century. Indeed, by 
1988, legislators had accepted that the elimination of mandatory jurisdic-
tion was “necessary” to enable the Court to perform its “principal 
functions”: “resolv[ing]” important issues of federal law and “ensur[ing] 
uniformity . . . in the law by resolving conflicts” among the lower 
courts.353 
Accordingly, the Exceptions Clause has—in actual operation by 
Congress—served to safeguard the Supreme Court’s settlement function. 
Through a process of legislative proposal, legislative defeat of court-
curbing measures, and legislative enactment of beneficial exceptions, 
Congress has ensured that the Court could “pronounce uniform and au-
                                                                                                                 
349. See Grove, Structural Safeguards, supra note 66, at 911–16 (discussing this 
jurisdiction-stripping effort). 
350. 150 Cong. Rec. H6583 (daily ed. July 22, 2004) (statement of Rep. Steny Hoyer, 
D-Md.); see also id. at H6581 (statement of Rep. John Conyers, Jr., D-Mich.) (“Never have 
we ever tried to do something as breathtaking as taking away the right of a Federal 
appeal . . . even to go to the Supreme Court . . . . This would be the only instance . . . that 
we have totally precluded the Federal courts from considering the constitutionality of 
Federal legislation.”). This measure did ultimately pass the House of Representatives, but 
social progressives used their structural veto in the Senate to block it. See Grove, 
Structural Safeguards, supra note 66, at 911–16 (discussing how social progressives on 
Senate Judiciary Committee effectively blocked measure). 
351. See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Power of Precedent 111, 127, 133, 138–42 (2008) 
(emphasizing importance of nonjudicial precedents and noting “members of Congress do 
not just create a precedent through formal lawmaking . . . [but rather] [t]heir inaction 
may produce precedents,” such as “when they vote against legislation”); see also Barry 
Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part II: Reconstruction’s 
Political Court, 91 Geo. L.J. 1, 64 (2002) (arguing “political economy of Court-tampering 
operates today” to protect Court’s exercise of judicial review as “[h]istorical precedents 
against Court-packing and jurisdiction-stripping pile up”). 
352. Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 96, at 258. 
353. H.R. Rep. No. 100-660, at 14 (1988). 
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thoritative rules of federal law” for a growing nation.354 As Attorney 
General William French Smith stated in his OLC opinion, “The gloss 
which life has written on the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction is one which 
protects the essential role of the Court in the constitutional plan.”355 
CONCLUSION 
The Exceptions Clause has long been treated by scholars as a serious 
threat to the Supreme Court’s central constitutional function: 
establishing definitive and uniform rules of federal law. But scholars have 
overlooked the ways in which Congress has used its broad exceptions 
power to facilitate the Court’s constitutional role. When the Supreme 
Court’s mandatory appellate docket grew to the point that it was unman-
ageable for a single tribunal, Congress responded by exercising its 
authority under the Exceptions Clause. Congress made “exceptions” to 
the Court’s mandatory appellate jurisdiction and replaced it with discre-
tionary review via writs of certiorari—precisely so that the Court could 
continue to resolve important federal questions and settle disputes 
among the lower courts. 
Thus, contrary to the concerns of many scholars, the Constitution does 
not, by giving Congress broad power over the Supreme Court’s appellate 
jurisdiction, “authorize[] its own destruction.”356 Instead, “[t]he authority 
vested in Congress to make exceptions to and regulate the appellate 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court” has served primarily to ensure that 
Congress could “shield that great tribunal” and “conform its appellate 
jurisdiction to the enormous growth of the business of the country.”357  
  
                                                                                                                 
354. Bator, supra note 3, at 1039. 
355. Constitutionality of Legislation Withdrawing Supreme Court Jurisdiction to 
Consider Cases Relating to Voluntary Prayer, 6 Op. O.L.C. 13, 25 (1982). 
356. Hart, supra note 1, at 1365. 
357. 21 Cong. Rec. 3404 (1890) (statement of Rep. David Culberson, D-Tex.). 
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